Systems and methodologies are described that facilitate security activation within a specified security activation time. Thus, where handover occurs or is initiated within the activation time, security keys can be activated in such a way as to not be substantially affected by the handover. In one example, a handover time can be set to occur beyond the security activation time to ensure the security activation happens first. Additionally, a handover command can comprise security keys that can be activated upon handover in another example. Moreover, in non-real-time contexts, dummy packets can be transmitted to allow timer operability with packet sequence numbering, or security activation times can be substantially ignored by utilizing a verification process.
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15. A wireless communications apparatus that activates security keys in wireless communications networks, comprising:
means for applying first security keys within a specified security activation time, wherein the security activation time is based at least in part on packet sequence numbers; and
means for initiating communications handover from a source access point to a target access point within the specified security activation time.
8. A wireless communications apparatus, comprising:
at least one processor configured to:
apply a first set of security keys determined from a source access point having a specified security activation time, wherein the security activation time is based at least in part on packet sequence numbers; and
complete handover of communications from the source access point to a target access point within the security activation time; and
a memory coupled to the at least one processor.
1. A method for activating security keys in wireless communications networks, comprising:
deriving first security keys from a core network component associated with a security activation time by which the security keys are to be applied, wherein the security activation time is based at least in part on packet sequence numbers;
applying the first security keys within the security activation time; and
handing over communications from a source access point to a target access point within the security activation time after applying the first security keys.
22. A computer program product, comprising:
a computer-readable storage medium comprising:
code for causing at least one computer to receive first security keys from a core network component associated with a security activation time by which the security keys are to be applied, wherein the security activation time is based at least in part on packet sequence numbers;
code for causing the at least one computer to apply the first security keys within the security activation time; and
code for causing the at least one computer to handover communications from a source access point to a target access point within the security activation time after applying the first security keys.
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This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent application Ser. No. 60/945,535 entitled “SECURITY KEY CHANGE IN LTE_ACTIVE STATE” which was filed Jun. 21, 2007. The entirety of the aforementioned application is herein incorporated by reference.
I. Field
The following description relates generally to wireless communications, and more particularly to security activation in wireless communications networks.
II. Background
Wireless communication systems are widely deployed to provide various types of communication content such as, for example, voice, data, and so on. Typical wireless communication systems may be multiple-access systems capable of supporting communication with multiple users by sharing available system resources (e.g., bandwidth, transmit power, . . . ). Examples of such multiple-access systems may include code division multiple access (CDMA) systems, time division multiple access (TDMA) systems, frequency division multiple access (FDMA) systems, orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) systems, and the like. Additionally, the systems can conform to specifications such as third generation partnership project (3GPP), 3GPP long term evolution (LTE), ultra mobile broadband (UMB), etc.
Generally, wireless multiple-access communication systems may simultaneously support communication for multiple mobile devices. Each mobile device may communicate with one or more base stations via transmissions on forward and reverse links. The forward link (or downlink) refers to the communication link from base stations to mobile devices, and the reverse link (or uplink) refers to the communication link from mobile devices to base stations. Further, communications between mobile devices and base stations may be established via single-input single-output (SISO) systems, multiple-input single-output (MISO) systems, multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems, and so forth. In addition, mobile, devices can communicate with other mobile devices (and/or base stations with other base stations) in peer-to-peer wireless network configurations.
The base stations can facilitate communication between the mobile devices and core wireless network components, such as authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) servers, one or more gateways, or any service providing components. For example, the core network components can be utilized to authenticate mobile devices for communicating with other devices or components of the wireless network. The authentication can utilize one or more security keys that can be transmitted from core network components to the mobile devices. The mobile devices can apply the keys to subsequent communications to ensure authenticity for the core network components. New security keys can be generated for a given time period, in one example. Additionally, the authentication can require that newly generated keys be utilized by the mobile devices within a specified time period.
The following presents a simplified summary of one or more embodiments in order to provide a basic understanding of such embodiments. This summary is not an extensive overview of all contemplated embodiments, and is intended to neither identify key or critical elements of all embodiments nor delineate the scope of any or all embodiments. Its sole purpose is to present some concepts of one or more embodiments in a simplified form as a prelude to the more detailed description that is presented later.
In accordance with one or more embodiments and corresponding disclosure thereof, various aspects are described in connection with facilitating security key activation for real-time and non-real-time wireless network utilization where the activation requires newly generated key usage within a given time period. Additionally, security key activation is provided for required activation times in the case of handing over device communications between access points. For example, handover activation timers can be utilized to ensure security activation completes before handover. In another example, new security keys can be utilized upon handing over communications. Moreover, in non-real-time utilization, security activation timers can be ignored or taken into account by transmitting dummy protocol data units to maintain substantially accurate packet sequence numbers, where the packet sequence numbers are utilized to track the security activation timer, for example.
According to related aspects, a method for activating security keys in wireless communications networks is provided. The method comprises receiving first security keys from a core network component associated with a security activation timer by which the security keys are to be applied. The method can further include applying the first security keys within the security activation timer and handing over communications from a source access point to a target access point within the security activation timer after applying the first security keys
Another aspect relates to a wireless communications apparatus. The wireless communications apparatus can include at least one processor configured to apply a first set of security keys determined from a source access point having a specified security activation time and complete handover of communications from the source access point to a target access point within the security activation time. The wireless communications apparatus can also include a memory coupled to the at least one processor.
Yet another aspect relates to a wireless communications apparatus that activates security keys in wireless communications networks. The wireless communications apparatus can comprise means for applying first security keys within a specified security activation time. The wireless communications apparatus can further include means for initiating: communications handover from a source access point to a target access point within the specified security activation time.
Still another aspect relates to a computer program product, which can have a computer-readable medium including code for causing at least one computer to receive first security keys from a core network component associated with a security activation time by which the security keys are to be applied. The computer-readable medium can also comprise code for causing the at least one computer to apply the first security keys within the security activation time. Moreover, the computer-readable medium can comprise code for causing the at least one computer to handover communications from a source access point to a target access point within the security activation time after applying the first security keys.
According to a further aspect, a method for activating security in non-real-time wireless communication network configurations is provided. The method can include receiving a security mode command message from an access point and resuming relevant radio bearers for transmitting a security mode complete message. The method can further comprise suspending the relevant radio bearers after transmitting the security mode complete message.
Another aspect relates to a wireless communications apparatus. The wireless communications apparatus can include at least one processor configured to resume relevant radio bearers for transmitting a security mode complete message. The at least one processor can be further configured to transmit the security mode complete message to a source access point and suspend the relevant radio bearers after transmitting the security mode complete message. The wireless communications apparatus can also include a memory coupled to the at least one processor.
Yet another aspect relates to a wireless communications apparatus for activating security in non-real-time wireless communication network configurations. The wireless communications apparatus can comprise means for receiving a security mode command message from an access point and means for resuming suspended relevant radio bearers for transmitting a security mode complete message. The wireless communications apparatus can further include means for suspending the relevant radio bearers after transmitting the security mode complete message.
Still another aspect relates to a computer program product, which can have a computer-readable medium including code for causing at least one computer to receive a security mode command message from an access point. Moreover, the computer-readable medium can comprise code for causing the at least one computer to resume suspended relevant radio bearers for transmitting a security mode complete message and code for causing the at least one computer to suspend the relevant radio bearers after transmitting the security mode complete message.
To the accomplishment of the foregoing and related ends, the one or more embodiments comprise the features hereinafter fully described and particularly pointed out in the claims. The following description and the annexed drawings set forth in detail certain illustrative aspects of the one or more embodiments. These aspects are indicative, however, of but a few of the various ways in which the principles of various embodiments may be employed and the described embodiments are intended to include all such aspects and their equivalents.
Various embodiments are now described with reference to the drawings, wherein like reference numerals are used to refer to like elements throughout. In the following description, for purposes of explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of one or more embodiments. It may be evident, however, that such embodiment(s) can be practiced without, these specific details. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are shown in block diagram form in order to facilitate describing one or more embodiments.
As used in this application, the terms “component,” “module,” “system,” and the like are intended to refer to a computer-related entity, either hardware, firmware, a combination of hardware and software, software, or software in execution. For example, a component can be, but is not limited to being, a process running on a processor, a processor, an object, an executable, a thread of execution, a program, and/or a computer. By way of illustration, both an application running on a computing device and the computing device can be a component. One or more components can reside within a process and/or thread of execution and a component can be localized on one computer and/or distributed between two or more computers. In addition, these components can execute from various computer readable media having various data structures stored thereon. The components can communicate by way of local and/or remote processes such as in accordance with a signal having one or more data packets (e.g., data from one component interacting with another component in a local system, distributed system, and/or across a network such as the Internet with other systems by way of the signal).
Furthermore, various embodiments are described herein in connection with a mobile device. A mobile device can also be called a system, subscriber unit, subscriber station, mobile station, mobile, remote station, remote terminal, access terminal, user terminal, terminal, wireless communication device, user agent, user device, or user equipment (UE). A mobile device can be a cellular telephone, a cordless telephone, a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) phone, a wireless local loop (WLL) station, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a handheld device having wireless connection capability, computing device, or other processing device connected to a wireless modem. Moreover, various embodiments are described herein in connection with a base station. A base station can be utilized for communicating with mobile device(s) and can also be referred to as an access point, Node B, evolved Node B (eNode B or eNB), base transceiver station (BTS) or some other terminology.
Moreover, various aspects or features described herein can be implemented as a method, apparatus, or article of manufacture using standard programming and/or engineering techniques. The term “article of manufacture” as used herein is intended to encompass a computer program accessible from any computer-readable device, carrier, or media. For example, computer-readable media can include but are not limited to magnetic storage devices (e.g., hard disk, floppy disk, magnetic strips, etc.), optical disks (e.g., compact disk (CD), digital versatile disk (DVD), etc.), smart cards, and flash memory devices (e.g., EPROM, card, stick, key drive, etc.). Additionally, various storage media described herein can represent one or more devices and/or other machine-readable media for storing information. The term “machine-readable medium” can include, without being limited to, wireless channels and various other media capable of storing, containing, and/or carrying instruction(s) and/or data.
The techniques described herein may be used for various wireless communication systems such as code division multiple access (CDMA), time division multiple access (TDMA), frequency division multiple access (FDMA), orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA), single carrier frequency domain multiplexing (SC-FDMA) and other systems. The terms “system” and “network” are often used interchangeably. A CDMA system may implement a radio technology such as Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (UTRA), CDMA2000, etc. UTRA includes Wideband-CDMA (W-CDMA) and other variants of CDMA. CDMA2000 covers IS-2000, IS-95 and IS-856 standards. A TDMA system may implement a radio technology such as Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM). An OFDMA system may implement a radio technology such as Evolved UTRA (E-UTRA), Ultra Mobile Broadband (UMB), IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX), IEEE 802.20, Flash-OFDM, etc. UTRA and E-UTRA are part of Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS). 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE) is an upcoming release of UMTS that uses E-UTRA, which employs OFDMA on the downlink and SC-FDMA on the unlink. UTRA. E-UTRA. UMTS. LTE and GSM are described in documents from an organization named “3rd Generation Partnership Project” (3GPP). CDMA2000 and UMB are described in documents from an organization named “3rd Generation Partnership Project 2” (3GPP2).
Referring now to
Base station 102 can communicate with one or more mobile devices such as mobile device 116 and mobile device 122; however, it is to be appreciated that base station 102 can communicate with substantially any number of mobile devices similar to mobile devices 116 and 122. Mobile devices 116 and 122 can be, for example, cellular phones, smart phones, laptops, handheld communication devices, handheld computing devices, satellite radios, global positioning systems, PDAs, and/or any other suitable device for communicating over wireless communication system 100. As depicted, mobile device 116 is in communication with antennas 112 and 114, where antennas 112 and 114 transmit information to mobile device 116 over a forward link 118 and receive information from mobile device 116 over a reverse link 120. Moreover, mobile device 122 is in communication with antennas 104 and 106, where antennas 104 and 106 transmit information to mobile device 122 over a forward link 124 and receive information from mobile device 122 over a reverse link 126. In a frequency division duplex (FDD) system, forward link 118 can utilize a different frequency band than that used by reverse link 120, and forward link 124 can employ a different frequency band than that employed by reverse link 126, for example. Further, in a time division duplex (TDD) system, forward link 118 and reverse link 120 can utilize a common frequency band and forward link 124 and reverse link 126 can utilize a common frequency band.
Each group of antennas and/or the area in which they are designated to communicate can be referred to as a sector of base station 102. For example, antenna groups can be designed to communicate to mobile devices in a sector of the areas covered by base station 102. In communication over forward links 118 and 124, the transmitting antennas of base station 102 can utilize beamforming to improve signal-to-noise ratio of forward links 118 and 124 for mobile devices 116 and 122. Also, while base station 102 utilizes beamforming to transmit to mobile devices 116 and 122 scattered randomly through an associated coverage, mobile devices in neighboring cells can be subject to less interference as compared to a base station transmitting through a single antenna to all its mobile devices. Moreover, mobile devices 116 and 122 can communicate directly with one another using a peer-to-peer or ad hoc technology as depicted.
According to an example, system 100 can be a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) communication system. Further, system 100 can utilize substantially any type of duplexing technique to divide communication channels (e.g., forward link, reverse link, . . . ) such as FDD, TDD, and the like. Moreover, the base station 102 can provide the mobile devices 116 and/or 122 with access to the wireless network via core network components. For example, the base station 102 can facilitate communications between the mobile devices 116 and/or 122 and the base station 102 to provide services, such as authentication and/or authorization. In one example, a core network authorization, authentication, and accounting (AAA) server (not shown), or other core network component, can authenticate the mobile devices 116 and/or 122 via base station 102 to utilize the wireless network. To this end, the AAA server/core network component can generate security keys in an authentication and key agreement (AKA) for the mobile devices 116/122 to utilize in subsequent communications and transmit the keys to the mobile devices 116/122 via the base station 102. According to an example, the AAA server, or a network policy for example, can set a security activation time by which the security keys must be utilized by the mobile devices 116/122 (e.g., 10 minutes). In addition, the security keys can have a specified life or expiration time (e.g., 5 hours).
As described herein, the mobile devices 116 and/or 122, a target base station, and a source base station can take the keys into use within the security activation time in a real-time context. In one example, where the security activation occurs during a handover in communication of a mobile device 116 and/or 122 to/from base station 102, an activation timer can be utilized for the handover such that the security activation time can be; reached before the handover activation time. In this regard, the handover can occur after the security activation. According to another example, security key change can occur upon handover such that new keys can be transmitted in the handover command. For non-real-time configurations, security keys can be assumed taken, into use and/or dummy protocol data units (PDU) can be transmitted to maintain packet sequence numbers as further described infra.
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In one example, the device 202 can communicate with the source access point 204 to receive wireless communications services, including communicating with one or more core network components. To this end, the core network can authenticate the device 202 via communication through the source access point 204. This can include transferring security keys and/or transferring parameters required to derive security keys to the device 202 in an AKA procedure where the device 202 can utilize the keys to authenticate subsequent communications with the source access point 204. As described, the security keys can have a security activation time by which the keys must be taken into use; additionally, the keys can have an expiration time. In real-time services where the device 202 is stationary, the security timing is of small consequence. However, where the device 202 is mobile and being handed over between access points, the security activation time can be handled in a few different ways. To this end, the wireless communication system 200 can ensure keys are taken into use, and the correct keys are utilized in communication, during handover.
According to an example, the wireless communication system 200 can utilize an activation timer for communications handover in real-time services. This can be possible as a device utilizing real-time services can have substantially reliable packet sequence numbering, which can be utilized to effectuate the timer. In this example, the device 202 and access points 204/206 can ensure the security activation time is reached before the handover activation time by setting the handover activation time beyond the security activation time. In the real-time services context, the security activation time can be set near in time, and thus the handover activation time can be set after that; it is to be appreciated that the handover activation time is not substantially affected as the security activation time can be small. According to this example, the device 202 can receive a security mode command (SMC) from the source access point 204, which can comprise the new security keys or parameters required to derive new security keys. The device 202 can transmit a security mode complete within the security activation time. During the security activation time, a handover command can be transmitted from the source access point 204 to the device 202 regarding handing over communications to the target access point 206. The handover activation timer can be set after the security activation timer such that security mode complete is transmitted before handing over communications to the target access point 206 via the handover complete message.
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According to yet another example, the new security keys from SMC can be cancelled at the time of handover. For instance, an SMC can be transmitted from the source access point 304 to the device 302 comprising new security keys or parameters required to derive new security keys. Additionally, a handover command can be sent from the source access point 304 to the device 302 to facilitate handing over communications to the target access point 306. In one example, the handover command can comprise the second new security key set or parameters required to derive the second new security key set for utilization in communicating with the target access point 306. In this regard, the wireless network and the device can cancel the previously derived first security key sets in favor of the new keys (e.g., where the security activation time has not been reached, where there is uncertainty as to whether the security activation time has been reached, etc.). The device 302 can associate the second new key set with target access point 306 communication (such as, for example, transmitting random access preambles before handover complete) and the old keys with the source access point 304. Once handover is complete, the old keys need not be retained as device 302 communication has been handed over to the target access point 306. If handover fails, for example, the device 302 can apply the old keys to continuing communicating with the source access point 304.
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In one example, as described, the security key receiver 602 can receive one or more security keys and/or parameters required to derive one or more security keys from an access point; the keys can originate from a core wireless network component, such as an AAA server, that can subsequently authenticate data sent from the communications apparatus 600. In this regard, the security key applicator 604 can be utilized to apply the security keys to subsequent communication data to facilitate such authentication. The security keys can have specified security activation and expiration times. As described supra, the security key applicator 604 can take the keys into use in a variety of ways while adhering to the times. For example, where handover is initiated before the security activation time is reached, the security key applicator 604 can set a handover activation time subsequent to the security activation time. In this way, handover can be put off until security activation has completed. Thus, the new keys can be applied before handover to ensure the keys are current upon handing over communications. In one example, as described, the security key applicator 604 can utilize a packet sequence number count as a timer in real-time services. In a non-real-time context, the communications apparatus 600 can transmit dummy PDUs to keep a more accurate packet sequence numbering for utilizing a timer.
In another example, after the security key receiver 602 receives the security keys, new keys can be; transmitted in a subsequent handover command. These can be sent to immediately apply the first keys sent or derived initially, for example. The security key applicator 604 can associate the keys sent in the handover command with a target access point, as described, while holding the first keys in case of communication with the source access point. For example, the security key applicator 604 can apply the keys transmitted in the handover command, and transmit a random access preamble. If the handover fails, the security key applicator 604 can apply the first set of keys for further communication with the source access point. Additionally, in a non-real-time services example, upon receiving a security mode command, the communications apparatus 600 can re-establish and suspend relevant radio bearers after transmitting a security complete message. Upon transmitting, this message a wireless network can assume the communications apparatus 600 has taken the keys into use. The communications apparatus 600 can subsequently receive a confirmation of security mode complete message receipt and resume radio bearers at that time.
In yet another example, after the security key receiver 602 receives the security keys, second keys, or instructions to derive such, can be transmitted in a subsequent handover command. These can be sent to cancel the first keys sent initially, for example. The security key applicator 604 can associate the second keys sent in the handover command with a target access point, as described, while holding the first keys in case of communication with the source access point. For example, the security key applicator 604 can apply the second keys transmitted in the handover command, and transmit a random access preamble. If the handover fails, the security key applicator 604 can apply the first keys, for further communication with the source access point. Moreover, if the security activation time expires, the security key applicator 604 can apply the first keys.
Now referring to
Source base station 702 includes a security key receiver 708 that receives security keys and/or parameters required to derive security keys for a mobile device from a core network component (not shown) and a handover command transmitter 710 that can facilitate handing over communications to the target base station 706. In one example, the security key receiver 708 can receive security keys and/or parameters required to derive security keys and transmit the keys to the mobile device 704 for utilization in authenticating communication at the core network level. In another example, the keys (or a new set of keys) and/or parameters required to derive keys can be transmitted in a handover command message generated and sent by the handover command transmitter 710.
Mobile device 704 includes a security key receiver 712 that can receive security keys and/or parameters required to derive security keys from base stations for use in authenticating communications being transmitted to the wireless network, a security key applicator 714 that can take the keys into use as described, and a security key store 716 that can hold keys for use with one or more previously or subsequently accessed base stations. In one example, the security key receiver 712 can receive keys and/or parameters required to derive keys from the source base station 702, apply the keys using the security key applicator 714, and store the keys in the security key store 716.
According to an example, after keys and/or parameters required to derive keys are initially transmitted to the mobile device 704, a handover command can be generated and sent to the mobile device 704 by the handover command transmitter 710. This can result from a handover request as the mobile device hears in proximity to the target base station 706, for example. This can occur during security activation time for real-time services as described, and the security key applicator 714 can set a handover activation time to occur subsequent to the security activation time. Once the security activation has completed and the security key applicator 714 has taken the keys into use, communications can be handed over to the target base station 706.
In another example, the security key receiver 708 can receive new keys and/or parameters required to derive keys to be transmitted with a handover command message. The handover command transmitter 710 can generate the message with the keys and/or parameters required to derive keys and send the message to the mobile device 704. The security receiver 712 of the mobile device 704 can receive the handover command and keys and/or parameters required to derive keys and can store the keys in the security key store 716 along with the previous keys. The security key applicator 714 can apply the new keys to messages transmitted to the target base station 706 while utilizing the previous keys for authenticating communications with the source base station 702. Thus, while trying to initiate handover with the target base station 706 (e.g., transmitting a random access preamble), the security key applicator 714 can utilize the keys transmitted in the handover message. If, however, handover fails, the security key applicator 714 can utilize the previous keys stored in the security key store 716 to communicate with the source base station.
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It will be appreciated that, in accordance with one or more aspects described herein, inferences can be made regarding ensuring security activation time is reached before handover completes and in non-real-time contexts as described. As used herein, the term to “infer” or “inference” refers generally to the process of reasoning about or inferring states of the system, environment, and/or user from a set of observations as captured via events and/or data. Inference can be employed to identify a specific context or action, or can generate a probability distribution over states, for example. The inference can be probabilistic—that is, the computation of a probability distribution over states of interest based on a consideration of data and events. Inference can also refer to techniques employed for composing higher-level events from a set of events and/or data. Such inference results in the construction of new events or actions from a set of observed events and/or stored event data, whether or not the events are correlated in close temporal proximity, and whether the events and data come from one or several event and data sources.
Mobile device 1200 can additionally comprise memory 1208 that is operatively coupled to processor 1206 and that can store data to be transmitted, received data, information related to available channels, data associated with analyzed signal and/or interference strength, information related to an assigned channel, power, rate, or the like, and any other suitable information for estimating a channel and communicating via the channel. Memory 1208 can additionally store protocols and/or algorithms associated with estimating and/or utilizing a channel (e.g., performance based, capacity based, etc.).
It will be appreciated that the data store (e.g., memory 1208) described herein can be either volatile memory or nonvolatile memory, or can include both volatile and nonvolatile memory. By way of illustration, and not limitation, nonvolatile memory can include read only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable PROM (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM), which acts as external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in many forms such as synchronous RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), Synchlink DRAM (SLDRAM), and direct Rambus RAM (DRRAM). The memory 1208 of the subject systems and methods is intended to comprise, without being limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.
Processor 1206 and/or receiver 1202 can further be operatively coupled to a security key receiver 1210 that can receive brie or more security keys from a core wireless network component (via base station, for example) to utilize in authenticating subsequent communications with the wireless network. In addition, the processor 1206 can be operatively coupled to a security key applicator 1212 that can apply the received security keys as described above. More specifically, in the case of impending handover for a mobile device 1200 in a real-time configuration, the security key applicator 1212 can set an activation timer to: expire subsequent to the security activation timer to ensure that security activation occurs before handover. In another example, the security key applicator 1212 can associate received keys with a source access point and keys from a handover command message with a target access point as described. In addition, the security key applicator 1212 can accommodate non-real-time configurations by transmitting dummy packets to keep a packet sequence number counter and/or suspending/resuming relevant radio bearers according to a verification procedure (e.g., L2-ACK, 3-way handshake, and/or the like) as described. Mobile device 1200 still further comprises a modulator 1214 and transmitter 1216 that respectively modulate and transmit signal to, for instance, a base station, another mobile device, etc. Although depicted as being separate from the processor 1206, it is to be appreciated that the security key receiver 1210, security key applicator 1212, demodulator 1204, and/or modulator 1214 can be part of the processor 1206 or multiple processors (not shown).
According to an example, the security key receiver 1318 can receive security keys and/or parameters used to derive security keys from a core wireless network component (not shown) for one or more mobile devices 1304. The base station 1302 can transmit the keys and/or the parameters used to derive keys to the mobile devices 1304 for subsequent utilization. Additionally, the security key receiver 1318 can receive new keys and/or parameters used to derive new keys to be applied for handing over communications as described. The handover command generator 1320 can create a handover command comprising the new keys and/or parameters used to derive the new keys and transmit the command to one or more mobile devices 1304 via the transmitter 1324, for example. Furthermore, although depicted as being separate from the processor 1314, it is to be appreciated that the security key receiver 1318, handover command generator 1320, demodulator 1312, and/or modulator 1322 can be part of the processor 1314 or multiple processors (not shown).
At base station 1410, traffic data for a number of data streams is provided from a data source 1412 to a transmit (TX) data processor 1414. According to an example, each data stream can be transmitted over a respective antenna. TX data processor 1414 formats, codes, and interleaves the traffic data stream based on a particular coding scheme selected for that data stream to provide coded data.
The coded data for each data stream can be multiplexed with pilot data using orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) techniques. Additionally or alternatively, the pilot symbols can be frequency division multiplexed (FDM), time division multiplexed (TDM), or code division multiplexed (GDM). The pilot data is typically a known data pattern that is processed in a known manner and can be used at mobile device 1450 to estimate channel response. The multiplexed pilot and coded data for each data stream can be modulated (e.g., symbol mapped) based on a particular modulation scheme (e.g., binary phase-shift keying (BPSK), quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK), M-phase-shift keying (M-PSK), M-quadrature amplitude modulation (M-QAM), etc.) selected for that data stream to provide modulation symbols. The data rate, coding, and modulation for each data stream can be determined by instructions performed or provided by processor 1430.
The modulation symbols for the data streams can be provided to a TX MIMO processor 1420, which can further process the modulation symbols (e.g., for OFDM). TX MIMO processor 1420 then provides NT modulation symbol streams to NT transmitters (TMTR) 1422a through 1422t. In various embodiments, TX MIMO processor 1420 applies beamforming weights to the symbols of the data streams and to the antenna from which the symbol is being transmitted.
Each transmitter 1422 receives and processes a respective symbol stream to provide one or more analog signals, and further conditions (e.g., amplifies, filters, and upconverts) the analog signals to provide a modulated signal suitable for transmission over the MIMO channel. Further, NT modulated signals from transmitters 1422a through 1422t are transmitted from NT antennas 1424a through 1424t, respectively.
At mobile device 1450, the transmitted modulated signals are received by NR antennas 1452a through 1452r and the received signal from each antenna 1452 is provided to a respective receiver (RCVR) 1454a through 1454r. Each receiver 1454 conditions (e.g., filters, amplifies, and downconverts) a respective signal, digitizes the conditioned signal to provide samples, and further processes the samples to provide a corresponding “received” symbol stream.
An RX data processor 1460 can receive and process the NR received symbol streams from NR receivers 1454 based on a particular receiver processing technique to provide NT “detected” symbol streams. RX data processor 1460 can demodulate, deinterleave, and decode each detected symbol stream to recover the traffic data for the data stream. The processing by RX data processor 1460 is complementary to that performed by TX MIMO processor 1420 and TX data processor 1414 at base station 1410.
A processor 1470 can periodically determine which precoding matrix to utilize as discussed above. Further, processor 1470 can formulate a reverse link message comprising a matrix index portion and a rank value portion.
The reverse link message can comprise various types of information regarding the communication link and/or the received data stream. The reverse link message can be processed by a TX data processor 1438, which also receives traffic data for a number of data streams from a data source 1436, modulated by a modulator 1480, conditioned by transmitters 1454a through 1454r, and transmitted back to base station 1410.
At base station 1410, the modulated signals from mobile device 1450 are received by antennas 1424, conditioned by receivers 1422, demodulated by a demodulator 1440, and processed by a RX data processor 1442 to extract the reverse link message transmitted by mobile device 1450. Further, processor 1430 can process the extracted message to determine which precoding matrix to use for determining the beamforming weights.
Processors 1430 and 1470 can direct (e.g., control, coordinate, manage, etc.) operation at base station 1410 and mobile device 1450, respectively. Respective processors 1430 and 1470 can be associated with memory 1432 and 1472 that store program codes and data. Processors 1430 and 1470 can also perform computations to derive frequency and impulse response estimates for the uplink and downlink, respectively.
It is to be understood that the embodiments described herein can be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, middleware, microcode, or any combination thereof. For a hardware implementation, the processing units can be implemented within one or more application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices (DSPDs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), processors, controllers, micro-controllers, microprocessors, other electronic units designed to perform the functions described herein, or a combination thereof.
When the embodiments are implemented in software, firmware, middleware or microcode, program code or code segments, they Can be stored in a machine-readable medium, such as a storage component. A code segment can represent a procedure, a function, a subprogram, a program, a routine, a subroutine, a module, a software package, a class, or any combination of instructions, data structures, or program statements. A code segment can be coupled to another code segment or a hardware circuit by passing and/or receiving information, data, arguments, parameters, or memory contents. Information, arguments, parameters, data, etc. can be passed, forwarded, or transmitted using any suitable means including memory sharing, message passing, token passing, network transmission, etc.
For a software implementation, the techniques described herein can be implemented with modules (e.g., procedures, functions, and so on) that perform the functions described herein. The software codes can be stored in memory units and executed by processors. The memory unit can be implemented within the processor or external to the processor, in which case it Can be communicatively coupled to the processor via various means as is known in the art.
With reference to
Turning to
What has been described above includes examples of one or more embodiments. It is, of course, not possible to describe every conceivable combination of components or methodologies for purposes of describing the aforementioned embodiments, but one of ordinary skill in the art may recognize that many further combinations and permutations of various embodiments are possible. Accordingly, the described embodiments are intended to embrace all such alterations, modifications and variations that fall within the spirit and scope of the appended claims. Furthermore, to the extent that the term “includes” is used in either the detailed description or the claims, such term is intended to be inclusive in a manner similar to the term “comprising” as “comprising” is interpreted when employed as a transitional word in a claim.
Tenny, Nathan Edward, Grilli, Francesco, Ho, Sai Yiu Duncan, Kitazoe, Masato
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