A method includes receiving, in a first device, an access request. The method further includes measuring a motion of the first device to determine a first motion value, performing a pairing protocol with a second device, and granting the access request responsive to a successful pairing in accordance with the pairing protocol. The pairing protocol comprises a cryptographic commitment process. The successful pairing is based at least in part on a determination that a second motion value supplied by the second device substantially matches the first motion value. The cryptographic commitment process comprises sending a committed first motion value to the second device prior to receiving the second motion value from the second device.
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17. A method comprising:
sending, to a first device from a second device, an access request;
measuring a motion of the second device;
performing a pairing protocol with the first device, the pairing protocol comprising a cryptographic commitment process; and
receiving, from the first device, an indication that the access request is granted responsive to a successful pairing in accordance with the pairing protocol, the successful pairing being based at least in part on a determination that a first motion value supplied by the first device substantially matches a second motion value determined by said measuring;
wherein the cryptographic commitment process comprises:
committing, in the second device, to the second motion value to determine a committed second motion value, the committed second motion value being bound to an output of a secure channel set-up;
sending the committed second motion value from the second device to the first device prior to receiving the first motion value from the first device;
receiving a committed first motion value at the second device from the first device;
receiving, responsive to sending the committed second motion value to the first device, a first decommitment value and the first motion value in the second device from the first device, the first decommitment value permitting verification of the committed first motion value;
verifying, in the second device, the committed first motion value utilizing the first decommitment value and the first motion value; and
determining whether the first motion value substantially matches the second motion value responsive to verifying the committed first motion value; and
wherein the first motion value substantially matches the second motion value if a distance between the first motion value and the second motion value does not exceed a threshold distance metric.
1. A method comprising:
receiving, in a first device, an access request;
measuring a motion of the first device to determine a first motion value;
performing a pairing protocol with a second device, the pairing protocol comprising a cryptographic commitment process; and
granting the access request responsive to a successful pairing in accordance with the pairing protocol, the successful pairing being based at least in part on a determination that a second motion value supplied by the second device substantially matches the first motion value;
wherein the cryptographic commitment process comprises:
committing, in the first device, to the first motion value to determine a committed first motion value, the committed first motion value being bound to an output of a secure channel set-up;
sending the committed first motion value from the first device to the second device prior to receiving the second motion value from the second device;
receiving a committed second motion value at the first device from the second device;
sending, responsive to receiving the committed second motion value, a first decommitment value and the first motion value from the first device to the second device, the first decommitment value permitting verification of the committed first motion value;
receiving a second decommitment value and the second motion value at the first device from the second device, the second decommitment value permitting verification of the committed second motion value;
verifying, in the first device, the committed second motion value utilizing the second decommitment value and the second motion value; and
determining whether the second motion value substantially matches the first motion value responsive to verifying the committed second motion value; and
wherein the second motion value substantially matches the first motion value if a distance between the first motion value and the second motion value does not exceed a threshold distance metric.
20. An apparatus comprising:
one or more motion sensors;
a memory; and
a processor coupled to the memory and configured to implement a motion-based pairing module for a second device, the motion-based pairing module being configured to:
send, to a first device, an access request;
initiate a motion measurement using the one or more sensors;
perform a pairing protocol with the first device, the pairing protocol comprising a cryptographic commitment process; and
receive, from the first device, an indication that the access request is granted responsive to a successful pairing in accordance with the pairing protocol, the successful pairing being based at least in part on a determination that a first motion value supplied by the first device substantially matches a second motion value determined based on the motion measurement;
wherein the motion-based pairing module is configured to perform the cryptographic commitment process by:
committing, in the second device, to the second motion value to determine a committed second motion value, the committed second motion value being bound to an output of a secure channel set-up;
sending the committed second motion value from the second device to the first device prior to receiving the first motion value from the first device;
receiving a committed first motion value at the second device from the first device;
receiving, responsive to sending the committed second motion value to the first device, a first decommitment value and the first motion value in the second device from the first device, the first decommitment value permitting verification of the committed first motion value;
verifying, in the second device, the committed first motion value utilizing the first decommitment value and the first motion value; and
determining whether the first motion value substantially matches the second motion value responsive to verifying the committed first motion value; and
wherein the first motion value substantially matches the second motion value if a distance between the first motion value and the second motion value does not exceed a threshold distance metric.
14. An apparatus comprising:
one or more motion sensors;
a memory; and
a processor coupled to the memory and configured to implement a motion-based pairing module for a first device, the motion-based pairing module being configured to:
receive an access request;
initiate a motion measurement using the one or more motion sensors;
determine a first motion value based on the motion measurement;
perform a pairing protocol with a second device, the pairing protocol comprising a cryptographic commitment process; and
grant the access request responsive to a successful pairing in accordance with the pairing protocol, the successful pairing being based at least in part on a determination that a second motion value supplied by the second device substantially matches the first motion value;
wherein the motion-based pairing module is configured to perform the cryptographic commitment process by:
committing, in the first device, to the first motion value to determine a committed first motion value, the committed first motion value being bound to an output of a secure channel set-up;
sending the committed first motion value from the first device to the second device prior to receiving the second motion value from the second device;
receiving a committed second motion value at the first device from the second device;
sending, responsive to receiving the committed second motion value, a first decommitment value and the first motion value from the first device to the second device, the first decommitment value permitting verification of the committed first motion value;
receiving a second decommitment value and the second motion value at the first device from the second device, the second decommitment value permitting verification of the committed second motion value;
verifying, in the first device, the committed second motion value utilizing the second decommitment value and the second motion value; and
determining whether the second motion value substantially matches the first motion value responsive to verifying the committed second motion value; and
wherein the second motion value substantially matches the first motion value if a distance between the first motion value and the second motion value does not exceed a threshold distance metric.
2. The method of
3. The method of
5. The method of
6. The method of
7. The method of
8. The method of
9. The method of
10. The method of
11. The method of
12. The method of
determining, in the first device, whether a distance between the first motion value and the second motion value exceeds the threshold distance metric; and
determining, in the first device, whether the first motion value represents at least a threshold amount of motion of the first device;
wherein the successful pairing in accordance with the pairing protocol is based on:
successfully verifying the committed second motion value;
determining that the distance between the first motion value and the second motion value does not exceed the threshold distance metric; and
determining that the first motion value represents at least the threshold amount of motion.
13. An article of manufacture comprising a processor-readable storage medium having instruction code embodied therein which when executed by a processor of the first device implements the steps of the method of
15. The apparatus of
16. The apparatus of
18. The method of
determining, in the second device, whether a distance between the first motion value and the second motion value exceeds the threshold distance metric; and
determining, in the second device, whether the second motion value represents at least a threshold amount of motion of the second device;
the method further comprising sending, from the second device to the first device, a second decommitment value and the second motion value responsive to:
successfully verifying the committed first motion value;
determining that the distance between the first motion value and the second motion value does not exceed the threshold distance metric; and
determining that the second motion value represents at least the threshold amount of motion.
19. An article of manufacture comprising a processor-readable storage medium having instruction code embodied therein which when executed by a processor of the second device implements the steps of the method of
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The present invention relates generally to device authentication, and more particularly to motion-based authentication of devices.
Users are increasingly likely to carry multiple devices on or near their persons on a regular basis. For example, as wearable computing devices such as fitness monitors, augmented-reality headsets and smartwatches grow in popularity, many users will have continuous access to two or more devices. Each of the devices can act as a “something-you-have” authentication factor and thus multiple devices may be used for multi-factor authentication processes.
Illustrative embodiments of the present invention provide techniques for motion-based authentication of devices.
In one embodiment, a method comprises receiving, in a first device, an access request, measuring a motion of the first device to determine a first motion value, performing a pairing protocol with a second device, and granting the access request responsive to a successful pairing in accordance with the pairing protocol. The pairing protocol comprises a cryptographic commitment process. The successful pairing is based at least in part on a determination that a second motion value supplied by the second device substantially matches the first motion value. The cryptographic commitment process comprises sending a committed first motion value to the second device prior to receiving the second motion value from the second device.
In another embodiment, an apparatus comprises one or more motion sensors, a memory, and a processor coupled to the memory and configured to implement a motion-based pairing module for a first device. The motion-based pairing module is configured to receive an access request, initiate a motion measurement using the one or more motion sensors, determine a first motion value based on the motion measurement, perform a pairing protocol with a second device, and grant the access request responsive to a successful pairing in accordance with the pairing protocol. The pairing protocol comprises a cryptographic commitment process. The successful pairing is based at least in part on a determination that a second motion value supplied by the second device substantially matches the first motion value. The motion-based pairing module is configured to perform the cryptographic commitment process by sending a committed first motion value to the second device prior to receiving the second motion value from the second device.
In another embodiment, a method comprises sending, to a first device from a second device, an access request, measuring a motion of the second device to determine a second motion value, performing a pairing protocol with the first device, and receiving, from the first device, an indication that the access request is granted responsive to a successful pairing in accordance with the pairing protocol. The pairing protocol comprises a cryptographic commitment process. The successful pairing is based at least in part on a determination that a first motion value supplied by the first device substantially matches the second motion value. The cryptographic commitment process comprises sending a committed second motion value to the first device prior to receiving the first motion value from the first device.
In another embodiment, an apparatus comprises one or more motion sensors, a memory, and a processor coupled to the memory and configured to implement a motion-based pairing module for a second device. The motion-based pairing module is configured to send, to a first device, an access request, initiate a motion measurement using the one or more sensors, determine a second motion value based on the motion measurement, perform a pairing protocol with the first device, and receive, from the first device, an indication that the access request is granted responsive to a successful pairing in accordance with the pairing protocol. The pairing protocol comprises a cryptographic commitment process. The successful pairing is based at least in part on a determination that a first motion value supplied by the first device substantially matches the second motion value. The motion-based pairing module is configured to perform the cryptographic commitment process by sending a committed second motion value to the first device prior to receiving the first motion value from the first device.
These and other features and advantages of embodiments of the present invention will become more readily apparent from the accompanying drawings and the following detailed description.
Illustrative embodiments of the present invention will be described herein with reference to exemplary communication systems and associated processing devices, networks, servers, etc. It is to be appreciated, however, that the invention is not restricted to use with the particular illustrative system and device configurations shown. Accordingly, the term “communication system” as used herein is intended to be broadly construed, so as to encompass, for example, systems in which multiple processing devices communicate with one another over a network.
Processing devices 102 and 104 comprise respective processors 120 and 140, memories 124 and 144, network interfaces 126 and 146 and motion sensors 128 and 148. Processing devices 102 and 104 further comprise respective motion-based pairing modules 122 and 142.
The processors 120 and 140 may comprise microprocessors, microcontrollers, application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) or other types of processing circuitry, as well as portions or combinations of such circuitry elements.
Each of the memories 124 and 144 may comprise random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), a hard disk drive (HDD), flash memory or other types of memory, in any combination. The memories 124 and 144 may be viewed as examples of what are more generally referred to herein as “computer program products” storing executable program code.
The network interfaces 126 and 146 allow the processing devices 102 and 104 to establish connection 106 and communicate with one another. The network interfaces 126 and 146 further permit processing device 102 and 104 to communicate over networks with other devices, servers, etc. not shown in
For security reasons, the connection 106 may be a short range or private connection. For example, many processing devices including cellular phones come equipped with Bluetooth network interface circuitry. As another example, near field communication (NFC) network interface circuitry is equipped in many newer processing devices such as cellular phones. The connection 106, however, may be another network type such as a WiFi or WiMAX network, a cellular network, a telephone or cable network, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN) a global computer network such as the Internet, or various portions or combinations of these and other types of networks.
Motion sensors 128 and 148 comprise one or more sensors which allow the processing devices 102 and 104 to measure motion. In some embodiments, motion sensors 128 and 148 comprise one or more accelerometers, one or more cameras, or combinations of accelerometers and cameras. Embodiments, however, are not limited solely to devices that include accelerometers and cameras for motion sensors. Instead, a wide range of other types of motion sensors may be utilized, including by way of example gyroscopes.
Processing devices 102 and 104 implement respective motion-based pairing modules 122 and 142. Motion-based pairing modules 122 and 142 may comprise hardware, software, or combinations of hardware and software which permit the processing devices 102 and 104 to perform various pairing protocols described below.
The processing devices 102 and 104 may include additional components not specifically illustrated in
It is to be appreciated that the particular set of elements shown in
As mentioned previously, various elements of system 100, including portions of the processing devices 102 and 104 such as functional modules 122 and 142, and other elements may be implemented at least in part in the form of software. Such software is stored and executed utilizing respective memory and processor elements of at least one processing device. The system 100 may include additional or alternative processing platforms, as well as numerous distinct processing platforms in any combination, with each such platform comprising one or more computers, servers, storage devices or other types of processing devices.
Such processing platforms may include cloud infrastructure comprising virtual machines (VMs) and one or more associated hypervisors. An example of a commercially available hypervisor platform that may be used to implement portions of the communication system 100 is the VMware® vSphere® which may have an associated virtual infrastructure management system such as the VMware® vCenter™. The underlying physical machines may comprise one or more distributed processing platforms that include storage products, such as VNX® and Symmetrix® VMAX®, both commercially available from EMC Corporation of Hopkinton, Mass. A variety of other storage products may be utilized to implement at least a portion of the system 100.
As discussed above, users are increasingly likely to carry multiple processing devices. In the implementation 300 a user has both a wearable computing device 302 and a smartphone 304. Embodiments of the invention utilize multiple processing devices to facilitate user authentication. Embodiments verify simultaneous user possession of two devices by observing correlated motion in the devices. The motion can be produced intentionally by having the user shake or otherwise move the devices in a correlated manner. Alternatively, motion may be observed and/or produced implicitly by a user that merely holds the devices at the same time or over some duration of time.
The presence of multiple, user-controlled devices with various sensors allows for several options for authentication and pairing protocols based on simultaneous motion. Embodiments will be described below primarily in the context of implementation 300, where a user has two wireless devices—the wearable computing device 302 and smartphone 304. For simplicity, the smartphone 304 will be denoted S below and the wearable computing device 302 will be denoted W below. It is to be noted, however, that embodiments are not limited solely to implementations in which the processing devices comprise smartphones and wearable computing devices. Instead, various other processing devices may be utilized. In addition, unless otherwise noted herein the functionality performed by S and W may be reversed.
In embodiments, a user can shake or otherwise move devices S and W simultaneously, or hold the devices S and W at the same time, to achieve any one of or combination of tasks. Examples of such tasks include, by way of example, establishing a shared key, authenticating access to a cryptographic key or key share on S and/or W, unlocking S or W, remote authentication to an authentication server using S and W, etc.
Simultaneous motion may be used for device pairing. For example, to establish an authenticated channel between devices without a pre-existing relationship, techniques can take the approach of deriving a shared cryptographic key between devices to pair them. As an example, given strings mS and mW representing motion readings by S and W, respectively, one approach is to apply a feature-derivation function ƒ to derive a common key κ=ƒ(mS)=ƒ(mW). Success is achieved if dist(mS, mW)≦d for some distance metric d and a predetermined threshold δ determined by ƒ. The requirement that ƒ be computed locally on each device, however, severely restricts the set of achievable distance metrics and also results in a high degree of entropy loss in κ.
Embodiments of the invention use lightweight approaches to device pairing based on shared motion such as correlated motions in one or more devices or simultaneous motion in one or more devices. Embodiments use cryptographic commitments, which permit comparison of mS and mW directly on S and W. As a result, a pairing device can enforce any desired distance metric between mS and mW.
In some embodiments, different devices enforce different distance metrics. In some instances a device may desire a higher degree of accuracy in the shared motion and thus selects and uses a less tolerant distance metric. As an example, a user may desire a higher degree of security for a smartphone relative to a wearable computing device. A smartphone may contain more sensitive private information and thus S may select a smaller distance metric relative to the distance metric selected by W. In other embodiments, W may select a smaller distance metric than S, or devices S and W may use the same distance metric.
Flexibility in distance metric selection permits the design of pairing protocols which are simpler and more computationally efficient while also better conserving entropy relative to techniques which use a feature-derivation function ƒ as described above.
Simultaneous movement of two or more devices may be utilized in a variety of contexts. For example, simultaneous shaking of two devices for secure pairing may be used to perturb radio emissions used to create shared keys so as to render an attacker unable to distinguish between emissions of the two devices. Shaking devices may also create a shared source of randomness from which cryptographic keys are derived.
Measurements from motion sensors such as accelerometers, however, are likely to differ somewhat even between devices experiencing similar movement. To counteract this, error tolerance is needed. As one example, derivation of short keys may be used. Short keys, however, lead to lower entropy and less security. Tree-based hashing approaches or fuzzy cryptography may also be used. Fuzzy cryptography is designed to derive a key from noisy measurement of a static value, such as a fingerprint. Accelerometer readings of shaken devices, in contrast, contain a high degree of one-time or transient randomness. Every shake is slightly different and unpredictable. Pairing protocols used in embodiments of the invention rely on the transient nature of the shared randomness associated with shared or correlated motion to two or more devices.
Pairing is the process of establishing a secure channel between two devices that lack a previously shared secret. Various techniques may be used to establish a shared secret. For example, a shared secret may be established via visual or auditory confirmation by a user, keying a secret into one or more devices to be paired, using shared environmental information such as radio-frequency signals, etc. Embodiments utilize device motion for pairing. However, as will be detailed below, embodiments are not limited solely to use of device motion. Instead, device motion may be a single factor in a multi-factor authentication process or some motion-based information may be combined with biometric measurements or other information associated with a user or device, etc.
As described above, devices may independently derive a shared key κ based on shared motion. This approach, however, results in a high degree of entropy loss, as the devices to be paired must individually attempt to eliminate differences between their respective readings. Thus, keys must generally by quite short to ensure equality. A key advantage of performing independent key derivation is to prevent leakage of key material between devices prior to pairing.
Embodiments pair devices using a one-time source of entropy, illustratively correlated or shared motion. Thus, it is possible for two devices S and W to reveal their respective motion measurements mS and mW after they have made cryptographically binding commitments to them. S and W can then independently compare the two measurements mS and mW.
In step 502, the first device 102 and the second device 104 establish a secure channel with a secure channel label. In the pairing protocol 500, W is the first device 102 and S is this second device 104. Next, in steps 504 and 506, the first device 102 commits to a measured motion reading mW and binds the committed mW to the secure channel label determined in step 502. In steps 508 and 510, the second device 104 commits to a measured motion reading mS and binds the committed mS to the secure channel label determined in step 502.
In step 512, the first device 102 and the second device 104 exchange the bound mS and mW values. Responsive to receiving the bound mS, the first device 102 sends in step 514 a decommitment value rW and mW to the second device 104. The second device 104 in step 516 verifies the committed mW utilizing rW, determines a distance a1 between mS and mW, and determines an amount of movement b1 which mS represents.
Verifying the committed mW allows the second device 104 to ensure that first device 102 in fact committed to the measurement mW instead of simply providing a random or unrelated bound committed value.
The second device 104 determines the distance a1 in order to ensure that mS and mW substantially match one another. The term substantially is used to indicate that an exact match is not necessarily required. As described above, devices such as the first device 102 and the second device 104 may select and utilize different distance metrics. mS and mW substantially match one another when the distance a1 is less than an allowable maximum variation or threshold. Thus, mS and mW substantially match one another when the first device 102 and the second device 104 perform correlated or similar motions. The correlated or similar motions may be shaking the devices at a substantially similar rate or in a same direction. Devices S and W may be shaken left to right or up and down, moved in a circle,
Determining the amount of movement b1 which S represents prevents an attacker that tries to exploit the lack of movement in one device to pair it with another. In requiring a minimum amount of movement, embodiments can prevent this type of attack. In other embodiments, however, it may be desirable to allow pairing through a lack of movement of a device. In such embodiments, the second device 104 need not determine the amount of movement b1 which mS represents.
The second device 104 in step 518 makes a determination as to whether mW was successfully verified, whether the distance a1 is less than a maximum allowable distance, and whether b1 represents at least a minimum amount of movement. If mW is verified, a1 is less than the maximum allowable distance, and b1 represents at least the minimum amount of movement, the second device 104 in step 522 sends a decommitment value rS and mS to the first device 102. Otherwise, the pairing is rejected in step 520.
The first device 102 in step 524 performs functionality similar to that described above with respect to 516. In step 524, the first device 102 verifies the committed mS utilizing rS, determines a distance a2 between mS and mW, and determines an amount of movement b2 which mW represents.
In step 526, the first device 102 makes a determination as to whether mS was successfully verified, whether the distance a2 is less than a maximum allowable distance, and whether b2 represents at least a minimum amount of movement. Responsive to this determination, the first device 102 either rejects the pairing in step 528 or permits access in step 530. In step 528, the first device 102 also waits a time τ before accepting a new request for access. The time τ in some embodiments is at least equal to the time required to take a full motion reading. Waiting for a time τ allows the first device 102 to ensure that the second device 104 cannot use the previously received mS to authenticate in a new session.
In some embodiments, the minimum amount of movement required by the first and second devices 102 and 104 may differ. In addition, the maximum allowable distance allowed by the first and second device 102 and 104 may differ.
The pairing protocol in
The pairing protocol in
Embodiments are not limited solely to use with TLS for secure channel set up. In some instances, S and W may have a preexisting trust relationship, and thus the secure channel may be treated as having been established by some other mechanism. In such instances, a preliminary message requesting session initiation may be used to initiate reading in the two devices. Such a preliminary message may be initiated by either device. A request for access may be considered such a preliminary message. The request for access may also be used to initiate the SecChannel protocol to establish the secure channel.
After setting up the secure channel, the devices S and W read respective motion values mS and mW. Each of the devices S and W then selects respective decommitment values rS and rW. In the
Next, devices S and W commit their respective readings mS and mW to the label s of the secure channel on which it is communicating, preventing its re-use, prior to decommitment, on a different channel. Commit denotes a cryptographic commitment protocol, which takes as input the motion reading, the secure label and the decommitment value. Commit outputs a commitment value, represented in
S and TV next exchange their respective committed values CS and CW. Device W, on receiving CS, sends mW and rW to device S. Using mW and rW, S is able to verify CW. S also checks whether min(mS)<c and whether dist(mW, mS)>d, where min represents a function used to check that the measurement mS exceeds a minimum threshold c of movement and dist is a function which checks whether the measurements mS and mW differ by more than a distance threshold d. Although
If CW≠Commit(mW, s); rW) or min(mS)<c or dist(mW, mS)>d, then the protocol rejects the pairing and the decommitment value rS is set to reject. Otherwise, device S sends rS and mS to the device W. Device W then performs a similar check, using mS and rS to verify CS, checking whether min(mW)<c and checking whether dist(mW, mS)>d. If CS≠Commit(mS, s); rS) or min(mW)<c or dist(mW, mS)>d, then W rejects the pairing and sets auth to reject. Otherwise, auth is set to accept. The device W then sends auth to device S. If auth is equal to reject, then the device W waits a time τ before permitting another access request.
On receiving an auth equal to accept, the device S may perform a number of actions. In some embodiments, the device S unlocks itself on receiving accept. In other embodiments, the device S permits W to access protected information on S on receiving accept. Such protected information may include a cryptographic key or key share.
In some embodiments, single-device decisions may be utilized. For example, an accept or reject decision may be made on a single device. Device S may receive a motion reading mW from device W and unlock itself on the basis of a local check, or provide access by W to protected information on S on the basis of the local check. A simplified and essentially one-sided variant of the
As described above with respect to
A wide variety of sensors may be used for taking motion readings. Examples of such sensors include accelerometers, cameras, gyroscopes, etc. The first processing device 102 may track the motion of the second processing device 104 using a video camera, in some cases causing the second processing device 104 to display a special symbol such as a Quick Response (QR) code to facilitate the tracking. In some embodiments, the processing devices 102 and 104 use other types of sensors to verify simultaneous possession as a supplement to or as an alternative to the use of motion sensors. For example, simultaneous possession can be detected by means of skin conductance with biometric sensors.
Embodiments may also use the above-described pairing protocols involving cryptographic commitment processes in conjunction with one or more other forms of authentication. In some embodiments, the accept outcome in the
In some embodiments, successful detection of correlated motion modifies the execution of other authentication protocols or initiates one or more follow-on authentication protocols. For example, a smartphone that confirms correlated motion with a wearable device may prompt a user to enter a three-digit PIN for unlocking the smartphone instead of a four-digit PIN.
A wide variety of authentication protocols using various cryptographic processes may be used in conjunction with the pairing protocols described herein. Examples of such conventional processes are disclosed in A. J. Menezes et al., Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997, which is incorporated by reference herein. These conventional processes, being well known to those skilled in the art, will not be described in further detail herein, although embodiments of the present invention may incorporate aspects of such processes.
The particular processing operations and other system functionality described in conjunction with
The foregoing examples are intended to illustrate aspects of certain embodiments of the present invention and should not be viewed as limiting in any way. Other embodiments can be configured that utilize different techniques, as well as combinations of the above-described techniques. For example, particular features described above with respect to a given embodiment are not restricted solely for use in the given embodiment unless otherwise noted. Instead, embodiments of the invention may combine features described above in conjunction with different embodiments.
It is to be appreciated that the processing functionality such as that described in conjunction with
Articles of manufacture comprising such processor-readable storage media are considered embodiments of the present invention. A given such article of manufacture may comprise, for example, a storage device such as a storage disk, a storage array or an integrated circuit containing memory. The term “article of manufacture” as used herein should be understood to exclude transitory, propagating signals.
It is to be appreciated that the particular configuration, elements and operating parameters of the embodiments described above are not requirements of the invention, and should not be construed as limiting the scope of the invention in any way. For example, while described above primarily in the context of a pairing protocol performed between two devices, S and W, embodiments are not so limited. The pairing protocols may be extended for use with the three or more devices. Those skilled in the art can make these and other modifications in the described embodiments in a straightforward manner.
Moreover, the various simplifying assumptions made above in the course of describing the illustrative embodiments should also be viewed as exemplary rather than as requirements or limitations of the invention. Numerous other alternative embodiments within the scope of the appended claims will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art.
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