instructions and logic support suspending and resuming migration of enclaves in a secure enclave page cache (EPC). An EPC stores a secure domain control structure (SDCS) in storage accessible by an enclave for a management process, and by a domain of enclaves. A second processor checks if a corresponding version array (VA) page is bound to the SDCS, and if so: increments a version counter in the SDCS for the page, performs an authenticated encryption of the page from the EPC using the version counter in the SDCS, and writes the encrypted page to external memory. A second processor checks if a corresponding VA page is bound to a second SDCS of the second processor, and if so: performs an authenticated decryption of the page using a version counter in the second SDCS, and loads the decrypted page to the EPC in the second processor if authentication passes.
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10. A method comprising:
allocating a secure domain control structure (SDCS) to a controlling enclave;
configuring the SDCS for a first secure enclave;
binding one or more pages of the first secure enclave to the SDCS;
accessing a first secure storage area, to write authenticated encrypted copies of the one or more pages from the first secure storage area to an external memory;
updating one or more versions for the one or more pages, respectively, in one or more version array pages in the first secure storage area for the SDCS;
accessing the first secure storage area, to write authenticated encrypted copies of the one or more version array pages from the first secure storage area to an external memory;
quiescing the SDCS and setting a corresponding attribute field in the SDCS to indicate that the SDCS is quiesced;
sealing the SDCS in an authenticated encrypted first structure; and
storing the authenticated encrypted first structure to the external memory.
25. A method comprising:
accessing an external memory to retrieve an authenticated encrypted first structure;
decrypting and authenticating a sealed secure domain control structure (SDCS) from the authenticated encrypted first structure;
allocating a secure enclave control structure (SECS) for a migrated SDCS;
configuring the migrated SDCS from the sealed SDCS;
loading an SDCS pointer for the migrated SDCS into a processor register;
recovering a version array slot from the SDCS into a version array slot for a first version array page of one or more version array pages;
loading copies of the one or more version array pages from the external memory;
decrypting and authenticating the copies of the one or more version array pages;
checking versions of the one or more version array pages against versions in the migrated SDCS;
loading copies of the one or more pages of the first secure enclave from the external memory; and
decrypting and authenticating the copies of the one or more pages of the first secure enclave.
7. A processor comprising:
an enclave page cache (EPC) to store a secure domain control structure (SDCS) data in a first secure storage area allocated to a corresponding domain set of secure enclaves, the SDCS data being accessible by a first secure enclave of a management process, and said domain set of secure enclaves including a second secure enclave of a second process;
a decode stage circuitry to decode one or more instructions for execution by said processor; and
execution unit circuitry, wherein responsive to a decoded first instruction of said one or more instructions, the first instruction specifying a first page to store in a second secure storage area of the EPC allocated to said second secure enclave, said one or more execution units are to check when a version array (VA) page corresponding to said first page is bound to said SDCS, and when said VA page is bound to said SDCS to:
perform an authenticated decryption, using the version counter in said SDCS, of the first page from a memory operatively coupled with said processor, and
load a decrypted copy of the first page to the EPC when an authentication of the authenticated decryption passes.
32. A processing system comprising:
an external memory; and
a processor comprising:
an enclave page cache (EPC) to store a secure domain control structure (SDCS) data in a first secure storage area allocated to a corresponding domain set of secure enclaves, the SDCS data being accessible by a first secure enclave of a management process, and said domain set of secure enclaves including a second secure enclave of a second process;
a decode stage to decode one or more instructions for execution by said processor; and
one or more execution units, wherein responsive to a decoded first instruction of said one or more instructions, the first instruction specifying a first page to store in a second secure storage area of the EPC allocated to said second secure enclave, said one or more execution units are to check when a version array (VA) page corresponding to said first page is bound to said SDCS, and when said VA page is bound to said SDCS to:
perform an authenticated decryption, using the version counter in said second SDCS, of the second page from the external memory, and
load a decrypted copy of the second page to the EPC when an authentication of the authenticated decryption passes.
28. A processing system comprising:
an external memory; and
a processor comprising:
an enclave page cache (EPC) to store a secure domain control structure (SDCS) data in a first secure storage area allocated to a corresponding domain set of secure enclaves, the SDCS data being accessible by a first secure enclave of a management process, and said domain set of secure enclaves including a second secure enclave of a second process;
a decode stage to decode one or more instructions for execution by said processor; and
one or more execution units, wherein responsive to a decoded first instruction of said one or more instructions, the first instruction specifying a first page stored in the EPC in a second secure storage area allocated to said second secure enclave, said one or more execution units are to check when a version array (VA) page corresponding to said first page is bound to said SDCS, and when said VA page is bound to said SDCS to:
increment a version counter in said SDCS corresponding to said first page,
perform an authenticated encryption of the first page from the EPC using the version counter in said SDCS, and
write back an encrypted copy of the first page from the EPC to the external memory.
1. A processor having a first processor core comprising:
an enclave page cache (EPC) to store a secure domain control structure (SDCS) data in a first secure storage area allocated to a corresponding domain set of secure enclaves, the SDCS data being accessible by a first secure enclave of a management process, and said domain set of secure enclaves including a second secure enclave of a second process;
a decode stage circuitry to decode one or more instructions for execution by said processor; and
execution unit circuitry, wherein responsive to a decoded first instruction of said one or more instructions, the first instruction specifying a first page stored in the EPC in a second secure storage area allocated to said second secure enclave, said one or more execution units are to check when a version array (VA) page corresponding to said first page is bound to said SDCS, and when said VA page is bound to said SDCS to:
increment a version counter in said SDCS corresponding to said first page,
perform an authenticated encryption of the first page from the EPC using the version counter in said SDCS, and
write back an encrypted copy of the first page from the EPC to a memory operatively coupled with said processor.
2. The processor of
3. The processor of
perform an authenticated decryption, using the version counter in said SDCS, of the first page from the memory, and
load a decrypted copy of the first page to the EPC when an authentication of the authenticated decryption passes.
4. The processor of
perform an authenticated decryption, using the version counter in said second SDCS, of the first page from the memory, and
load a decrypted copy of the first page to the EPC of the second processor core when an authentication of the authenticated decryption passes.
5. The processor of
6. The processor of
8. The processor of
9. The processor of
11. The method of
12. The method of
13. The method of
14. The method of
15. The method of
16. The method of
17. The method of
saving a version array slot for a last version array page into a version array slot in the SDCS.
18. The method of
19. The method of
20. The method of
verifying that the SDCS is quiesced;
copying all software accessible fields in the SDCS to a persistent first structure;
encrypting and authenticating the persistent first structure to generate the authenticated encrypted first structure.
21. The method of
accessing the external memory to retrieve the authenticated encrypted first structure;
decrypting and authenticating the sealed SDCS from the authenticated encrypted first structure;
allocating a secure enclave control structure (SECS) for a migrated SDCS;
configuring the migrated SDCS from the sealed SDCS;
loading an SDCS pointer for the migrated SDCS into a processor register;
loading a version array slot from the SDCS into a version array slot for a first version array page;
loading copies of the one or more version array pages from the external memory;
decrypting and authenticating the copies of the one or more version array pages;
checking versions of the one or more version array pages against versions in the migrated SDCS;
loading copies of the one or more pages of the first secure enclave from the external memory; and
decrypting and authenticating the copies of the one or more pages of the first secure enclave.
22. The method of
23. The method of
24. The method of
26. The method of
27. The method of
29. The processor of
30. The processing system of
perform an authenticated decryption, using the version counter in said second SDCS, of the second page from the external memory, and
load a decrypted copy of the second page to the EPC when an authentication of the authenticated decryption passes.
31. The processor of
33. The processor of
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This application is related to application Ser. No. 13/729,277, titled “Paging in Secure Enclaves,” filed Dec. 28, 2012; to application Ser. No. 13/854,107, titled “Instructions and Logic to Provide Advanced Paging Capabilities for Secure Enclave Page Caches,” filed Mar. 31, 2013; to application Ser. No. 14/318,508, titled “Instructions and Logic to Interrupt and Resume Paging in a Secure Enclave Page Cache,” filed Jun. 27, 2014; to application Ser. No. 14/725,227, titled “Processor Extensions to support Live Migration of an Enclaves,” filed Jun. 26, 2015; and to application Ser. No. 14/829,340, titled “Processor Extensions to support the Migration of an Enclave,” filed Aug. 18, 2015.
The present disclosure pertains to the field of processing logic, microprocessors, and associated instruction set architecture that, when executed by the processor or other processing logic, perform loading, storing, logical, mathematical, or other functional operations. In particular, the disclosure relates to instructions and logic to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves in a secure enclave page cache.
Applications and high performance networks to support new usage models and services such as voice, video, transactions, and private data, present new challenges in the area of security. The need to protect data in storage or in transit for confidentiality and integrity is important, but supporting high speed cryptographic operations and storage required to maintain secured access to protected code and/or data adds to complexity and ultimately to expense.
One technique for creating and maintaining a secured, protected, or isolated partition or environment is known as establishing an enclave. An enclave is a set of information and processing capabilities that are protected as a group. The information and processing capabilities may include networks, hosts, or applications. When data and/or instructions for an enclave are loaded from external memory, they are decrypted, authenticated and then stored or cached in a protected memory. Similarly when data and/or instructions for an enclave are evicted from the protected memory, they are encrypted before being stored back to external memory. Secure enclave data is allocated to a particular process and associated with a unique enclave identifier for that process, such that access to the secure enclave data is restricted to an authorized process. Not even the operating system is permitted to access decrypted enclave data associated with an enclave identifier of a different process.
Therefore, when a process that has been allocated a secure enclave needs to be migrated to another machine, platform or server, the operating system cannot access the decrypted enclave data associated with the parent process. Accordingly, the operating system may not be able to duplicate the state of a process for a migrated process while the secure enclave allocated to the running process is still active. Furthermore, the secure enclave is bound to a platform by its keys, so in order to migrate to another platform, the platform needs to be virtualized and the secure enclave needs to be bound instead to a virtual machine or container running on the platform. Then, at least when the secure enclave is shutdown, the process and/or virtual machine could be securely migrated to another physical platform.
In order for the operating system to duplicate the secure enclave state allocated to a process for migrating that process to another physical platform, memory pages may typically be paged out of, and invalidated from the protected memory. When the operating system is performing paging in (i.e. loading) and/or paging out (i.e. evicting and writing back) of memory pages for a secure enclave, cryptographic operations must be performed on entire pages, which may be typically of 4 KB in size. Consequently, page copying operations for a secure enclave may require many tens of thousands of processing cycles. If a paging process is interrupted, it may need to be re-executed, but if servicing of interrupts were not permitted until paging operations for the secure enclave had completed, then the delayed servicing of interrupts may cause unacceptable glitches in some services such as voice, video and real-time transactions. It will be appreciated that to be securely migrated to another physical platform, any copying of memory data pages and/or executable pages would need to be securely managed, and especially if the copying of such data pages and/or executable pages occurred during a live migration of the virtual machine or container to another platform, a version control of each memory data page and/or executable page for the secure enclave would also need to be securely managed.
Therefore duplicating pages of data and state for a secure enclave to migrate a process to another machine, platform or server presents a set of unique security, user-experience and performance challenges. To date, solutions that address these challenges, potential performance limiting issues, and real-time complexities have not been adequately explored.
The present invention is illustrated by way of example and not limitation in the figures of the accompanying drawings.
The following description discloses instructions and processing logic to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves in a secure enclave page cache within or in association with a processor, computer system, or other processing apparatus.
In a special cache or portion of a cache holding only private or protected data, e.g. associated with an enclave, access to that private or protected data when it is unencrypted can be restricted only to authorized processor cores, hardware threads, or logical processors. Such an enclave private memory may be referred to as an enclave page cache (EPC) memory. As with other physical memory, the EPC can be made to support a larger private or protected address space by paging in and paging out data and/or code as needed.
According to some embodiments, instructions and logic support suspending and resuming migration of enclaves in a secure EPC. An EPC stores a secure domain control structure (SDCS) in storage accessible by an enclave for a management process, and by a domain of enclaves. A processor checks if a corresponding version array (VA) page is bound to the SDCS, and if so: increments a version counter in the SDCS for the page, performs an authenticated encryption of the page from the EPC using the version counter in the SDCS, and writes the encrypted page to external memory. A second processor checks if a corresponding VA page is bound to a second SDCS of the second processor, and if so: performs an authenticated decryption of the page using a version counter in the second SDCS, and loads the decrypted page to the EPC in the second processor if authentication passes.
Instructions of some embodiments specify addresses for secure storage allocated in the EPC to domain enclaves of a process or processes to store secure enclave control structure data, application data, application code, etc. In some embodiments, a management process enclave (e.g. for a virtual machine manager (VMM) or a secure container) may execute, or cause a system Software Guard Extension (SGX) library to execute instructions to bind one or more pages of domain enclaves to the SDCS. A secure storage area may be accessed, by a management process enclave, to write authenticated encrypted copies of the one or more pages from the secure storage area to an external memory. One or more versions for the one or more pages may be updated, respectively, in version array pages in the secure storage area for the SDCS. The secure storage area may also be accessed, by the management process enclave, to write authenticated encrypted copies of the one or more version array pages from the secure storage area to external memory. A version array slot for a last version array page may be stored into the SDCS for authentication of a migrated image of the secure enclaves. The SDCS may then be shutdown, deactivated or “quiesced,” by the management process enclave, and a corresponding attribute field in the SDCS may be set to indicate that the SDCS is quiesced. A trusted migration enclave may then, verify that the SDCS is quiesced, and seal the SDCS in an authenticated encrypted persistent data structure, placing it in external non-volatile memory for migration, and the management process enclave may then deallocate the original SDCS.
In some embodiments, another trusted migration enclave (e.g. on another platform) may execute, or cause a system Software Guard Extension (SGX) library to execute instructions to access external memory to retrieve such an authenticated encrypted persistent data structure for migration of the secure enclaves to the new platform. The sealed SDCS from the authenticated encrypted persistent data structure is decrypted and authenticated, and it is verified that security policies in the meta-data permit secure enclaves associated with the virtual machine to be resumed. Accordingly, a secure enclave control structure (SECS) for the migrated SDCS is allocated for the virtual machine by the trusted migration enclave, and a local ID for the virtual machine is assigned. The migrated SDCS may then be configured from the sealed SDCS persistent data structure, and another management process enclave (e.g. for a virtual machine manager (VMM) or a secure container on another platform) may load an SDCS pointer for the migrated SDCS into a processor register of the new platform. A version array slot is loaded from the SDCS into a version array slot for a first version array page. Copies of the one or more version array pages may then be loaded from the external memory, decrypted and authenticated, while checking versions of the one or more version array pages against versions in the migrated SDCS. Copies of the one or more enclave pages may then be loaded from the external memory, decrypted and authenticated, while checking versions of the one or more enclave pages against versions in the migrated SDCS.
It will be appreciated that through use of the above enclave instructions to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves, the migration process (e.g. where secure enclave page cache memory contents associated with a virtual machine are authenticated, encrypted and written back, the TLB entries are flushed, version counters for pages are recorded for authentication and securely stored, and the virtual machine is migrated to another platform and resumed, etc.) can be broken into stages wherein processor cores or logical processors may continue to execute from read-only pages during one or more stages. As pages are naturally paged out, they may be made ready for migration. If one or more pages are modified, they may be re-authenticated, encrypted and written back, and their version counters incremented. Version array pages may be processed similarly, and version array information is securely transported to the migration platform. Thus performance degradation due to the migration process may be reduced while guaranteeing security of the secure enclave data and without requiring undue complexity and design effort.
In some embodiments, instructions and logic herein disclosed are able to be interrupted and resumed in migrating secure domain processes, and in page copying operations from within secure enclaves. Therefore forward progress of migrating secure domain processes and establishing authenticated copies of pages for secure enclaves may guaranteed, and unacceptable glitches in services such as voice, video and real-time transactions may be avoided by timely servicing pending interrupts. It will be appreciated that at any such time that versions do not match and/or authentication fails for the migrated secure domain, the migration process may be suspended in the target platform, and the originating platform may be signaled to resume the migration process beginning at the point which was the cause of failure, such that the offending pages may be re-authenticated, encrypted and written back, and their version counters incremented. Thus the secure migration process provides, not only for detection and prevention of corruption and/or tampering, but also for recovery after such a detection and resumption of the migration process in the originating platform.
It will also be appreciated that without processor support for such instructions, any software system security features to accomplish the same (or similar) technical effects may (if at all feasible) be prohibitively expensive and/or performance limiting to an extent that some lesser measure of security may be accepted disadvantageously.
In the following description, numerous specific details such as processing logic, processor types, micro-architectural conditions, events, enablement mechanisms, and the like are set forth in order to provide a more thorough understanding of embodiments of the present invention. It will be appreciated, however, by one skilled in the art that the invention may be practiced without such specific details. Additionally, some well known structures, circuits, and the like have not been shown in detail to avoid unnecessarily obscuring embodiments of the present invention.
Although the following embodiments are described with reference to a processor, other embodiments are applicable to other types of integrated circuits and logic devices. Similar techniques and teachings of embodiments of the present invention can be applied to other types of circuits or semiconductor devices that can benefit from higher pipeline throughput and improved performance. The teachings of embodiments of the present invention are applicable to any processor or machine that performs data manipulations. However, the present invention is not limited to processors or machines that perform 512 bit, 256 bit, 128 bit, 64 bit, 32 bit, or 16 bit data operations and can be applied to any processor and machine in which manipulation or management of data is performed. In addition, the following description provides examples, and the accompanying drawings show various examples for the purposes of illustration. However, these examples should not be construed in a limiting sense as they are merely intended to provide examples of embodiments of the present invention rather than to provide an exhaustive list of all possible implementations of embodiments of the present invention.
Although the below examples describe instruction handling and distribution in the context of execution units and logic circuits, other embodiments of the present invention can be accomplished by way of data and/or instructions stored on a machine-readable, tangible medium, which when performed by a machine cause the machine to perform functions consistent with at least one embodiment of the invention. In one embodiment, functions associated with embodiments of the present invention are embodied in machine-executable instructions. The instructions can be used to cause a general-purpose or special-purpose processor that is programmed with the instructions to perform the steps of the present invention. Embodiments of the present invention may be provided as a computer program product or software which may include a machine or computer-readable medium having stored thereon instructions which may be used to program a computer (or other electronic devices) to perform one or more operations according to embodiments of the present invention. Alternatively, steps of embodiments of the present invention might be performed by specific hardware components that contain fixed-function logic for performing the steps, or by any combination of programmed computer components and fixed-function hardware components.
Instructions used to program logic to perform embodiments of the invention can be stored within a memory in the system, such as DRAM, cache, flash memory, or other storage. Furthermore, the instructions can be distributed via a network or by way of other computer readable media. Thus a machine-readable medium may include any mechanism for storing or transmitting information in a form readable by a machine (e.g., a computer), but is not limited to, floppy diskettes, optical disks, Compact Disc, Read-Only Memory (CD-ROMs), and magneto-optical disks, Read-Only Memory (ROMs), Random Access Memory (RAM), Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EPROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM), magnetic or optical cards, flash memory, or a tangible, machine-readable storage used in the transmission of information over the Internet via electrical, optical, acoustical or other forms of propagated signals (e.g., carrier waves, infrared signals, digital signals, etc.). Accordingly, the computer-readable medium includes any type of tangible machine-readable medium suitable for storing or transmitting electronic instructions or information in a form readable by a machine (e.g., a computer).
A design may go through various stages, from creation to simulation to fabrication. Data representing a design may represent the design in a number of manners. First, as is useful in simulations, the hardware may be represented using a hardware description language or another functional description language. Additionally, a circuit level model with logic and/or transistor gates may be produced at some stages of the design process. Furthermore, most designs, at some stage, reach a level of data representing the physical placement of various devices in the hardware model. In the case where conventional semiconductor fabrication techniques are used, the data representing the hardware model may be the data specifying the presence or absence of various features on different mask layers for masks used to produce the integrated circuit. In any representation of the design, the data may be stored in any form of a machine readable medium. A memory or a magnetic or optical storage such as a disc may be the machine readable medium to store information transmitted via optical or electrical wave modulated or otherwise generated to transmit such information. When an electrical carrier wave indicating or carrying the code or design is transmitted, to the extent that copying, buffering, or re-transmission of the electrical signal is performed, a new copy is made. Thus, a communication provider or a network provider may store on a tangible, machine-readable medium, at least temporarily, an article, such as information encoded into a carrier wave, embodying techniques of embodiments of the present invention.
In modern processors, a number of different execution units are used to process and execute a variety of code and instructions. Not all instructions are created equal as some are quicker to complete while others can take a number of clock cycles to complete. The faster the throughput of instructions, the better the overall performance of the processor. Thus it would be advantageous to have as many instructions execute as fast as possible. However, there are certain instructions that have greater complexity and require more in terms of execution time and processor resources. For example, there are floating point instructions, load/store operations, data moves, etc.
As more computer systems are used in internet, text, and multimedia applications, additional processor support has been introduced over time. In one embodiment, an instruction set may be associated with one or more computer architectures, including data types, instructions, register architecture, addressing modes, memory architecture, interrupt and exception handling, and external input and output (I/O).
In one embodiment, the instruction set architecture (ISA) may be implemented by one or more micro-architectures, which includes processor logic and circuits used to implement one or more instruction sets. Alternative embodiments may implement the ISA through microcode, extended microcode or microcode assists, a hypervisor, binary translation, hardware recompilation, etc. Accordingly, processors with different micro-architectures can share at least a portion of a common instruction set. For example, Intel® Pentium 4 processors, Intel® Core™ processors, and processors from Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. of Sunnyvale Calif. implement nearly identical versions of the x86 instruction set (with some extensions that have been added with newer versions), but have different internal designs. Similarly, processors designed by other processor development companies, such as ARM Holdings, Ltd., MIPS, or their licensees or adopters, may share at least a portion a common instruction set, but may include different processor designs. For example, the same register architecture of the ISA may be implemented in different ways in different micro-architectures using new or well-known techniques, including dedicated physical registers, one or more dynamically allocated physical registers using a register renaming mechanism (e.g., the use of a Register Alias Table (RAT), a Reorder Buffer (ROB) and a retirement register file. In one embodiment, registers may include one or more registers, register architectures, register files, or other register sets that may or may not be addressable by a software programmer.
In one embodiment, an instruction may include one or more instruction formats. In one embodiment, an instruction format may indicate various fields (number of bits, location of bits, etc.) to specify, among other things, the operation to be performed and the operand(s) on which that operation is to be performed. Some instruction formats may be further broken defined by instruction templates (or sub formats). For example, the instruction templates of a given instruction format may be defined to have different subsets of the instruction format's fields and/or defined to have a given field interpreted differently. In one embodiment, an instruction is expressed using an instruction format (and, if defined, in a given one of the instruction templates of that instruction format) and specifies or indicates the operation and the operands upon which the operation will operate.
Scientific, financial, auto-vectorized general purpose, RMS (recognition, mining, and synthesis), and visual and multimedia applications (e.g., 2D/3D graphics, image processing, video compression/decompression, voice recognition algorithms and audio manipulation) may require the same operation to be performed on a large number of data items. In one embodiment, Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) refers to a type of instruction that causes a processor to perform an operation on multiple data elements. SIMD technology may be used in processors that can logically divide the bits in a register into a number of fixed-sized or variable-sized data elements, each of which represents a separate value. For example, in one embodiment, the bits in a 64-bit register may be organized as a source operand containing four separate 16-bit data elements, each of which represents a separate 16-bit value. This type of data may be referred to as ‘packed’ data type or ‘vector’ data type, and operands of this data type are referred to as packed data operands or vector operands. In one embodiment, a packed data item or vector may be a sequence of packed data elements stored within a single register, and a packed data operand or a vector operand may a source or destination operand of a SIMD instruction (or ‘packed data instruction’ or a ‘vector instruction’). In one embodiment, a SIMD instruction specifies a single vector operation to be performed on two source vector operands to generate a destination vector operand (also referred to as a result vector operand) of the same or different size, with the same or different number of data elements, and in the same or different data element order.
SIMD technology, such as that employed by the Intel® Core™ processors having an instruction set including x86, MMX™, Streaming SIMD Extensions (SSE), SSE2, SSE3, SSE4.1, and SSE4.2 instructions, ARM processors, such as the ARM Cortex® family of processors having an instruction set including the Vector Floating Point (VFP) and/or NEON instructions, and MIPS processors, such as the Loongson family of processors developed by the Institute of Computing Technology (ICT) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, has enabled a significant improvement in application performance (Core™ and MMX™ are registered trademarks or trademarks of Intel Corporation of Santa Clara, Calif.).
In one embodiment, destination and source registers/data are generic terms to represent the source and destination of the corresponding data or operation. In some embodiments, they may be implemented by registers, memory, or other storage areas having other names or functions than those depicted. For example, in one embodiment, “DEST1” may be a temporary storage register or other storage area, whereas “SRC1” and “SRC2” may be a first and second source storage register or other storage area, and so forth. In other embodiments, two or more of the SRC and DEST storage areas may correspond to different data storage elements within the same storage area (e.g., a SIMD register). In one embodiment, one of the source registers may also act as a destination register by, for example, writing back the result of an operation performed on the first and second source data to one of the two source registers serving as a destination registers.
Embodiments are not limited to computer systems. Alternative embodiments of the present invention can be used in other devices such as handheld devices and embedded applications. Some examples of handheld devices include cellular phones, Internet Protocol devices, digital cameras, personal digital assistants (PDAs), and handheld PCs. Embedded applications can include a micro controller, a digital signal processor (DSP), system on a chip, network computers (NetPC), set-top boxes, network hubs, wide area network (WAN) switches, or any other system that can perform one or more instructions in accordance with at least one embodiment.
In one embodiment, the processor 102 includes a Level 1 (L1) internal cache memory 104. Depending on the architecture, the processor 102 can have a single internal cache or multiple levels of internal cache. Alternatively, in another embodiment, the cache memory can reside external to the processor 102. Other embodiments can also include a combination of both internal and external caches depending on the particular implementation and needs. Register file 106 can store different types of data in various registers including integer registers, floating point registers, status registers, and instruction pointer register.
Execution unit 108, including logic to perform integer and floating point operations, also resides in the processor 102. The processor 102 also includes a microcode (ucode) ROM that stores microcode for certain macroinstructions. For one embodiment, execution unit 108 includes logic to handle a packed instruction set 109. By including the packed instruction set 109 in the instruction set of a general-purpose processor 102, along with associated circuitry to execute the instructions, the operations used by many multimedia applications may be performed using packed data in a general-purpose processor 102. Thus, many multimedia applications can be accelerated and executed more efficiently by using the full width of a processor's data bus for performing operations on packed data. This can eliminate the need to transfer smaller units of data across the processor's data bus to perform one or more operations one data element at a time.
Alternate embodiments of an execution unit 108 can also be used in micro controllers, embedded processors, graphics devices, DSPs, and other types of logic circuits. System 100 includes a memory 120. Memory 120 can be a dynamic random access memory (DRAM) device, a static random access memory (SRAM) device, flash memory device, or other memory device. Memory 120 can store instructions and/or data represented by data signals that can be executed by the processor 102.
A system logic chip 116 is coupled to the processor bus 110 and memory 120. The system logic chip 116 in the illustrated embodiment is a memory controller hub (MCH). The processor 102 can communicate to the MCH 116 via a processor bus 110. The MCH 116 provides a high bandwidth memory path 118 to memory 120 for instruction and data storage and for storage of graphics commands, data and textures. The MCH 116 is to direct data signals between the processor 102, memory 120, and other components in the system 100 and to bridge the data signals between processor bus 110, memory 120, and system I/O 122. In some embodiments, the system logic chip 116 can provide a graphics port for coupling to a graphics controller 112. The MCH 116 is coupled to memory 120 through a memory interface 118. The graphics card 112 is coupled to the MCH 116 through an Accelerated Graphics Port (AGP) interconnect 114.
System 100 uses a proprietary hub interface bus 122 to couple the MCH 116 to the I/O controller hub (ICH) 130. The ICH 130 provides direct connections to some I/O devices via a local I/O bus. The local I/O bus is a high-speed I/O bus for connecting peripherals to the memory 120, chipset, and processor 102. Some examples are the audio controller, firmware hub (flash BIOS) 128, wireless transceiver 126, data storage 124, legacy I/O controller containing user input and keyboard interfaces, a serial expansion port such as Universal Serial Bus (USB), and a network controller 134. The data storage device 124 can comprise a hard disk drive, a floppy disk drive, a CD-ROM device, a flash memory device, or other mass storage device.
For another embodiment of a system, an instruction in accordance with one embodiment can be used with a system on a chip. One embodiment of a system on a chip comprises of a processor and a memory. The memory for one such system is a flash memory. The flash memory can be located on the same die as the processor and other system components. Additionally, other logic blocks such as a memory controller or graphics controller can also be located on a system on a chip.
Computer system 140 comprises a processing core 159 capable of performing at least one instruction in accordance with one embodiment. For one embodiment, processing core 159 represents a processing unit of any type of architecture, including but not limited to a CISC, a RISC or a VLIW type architecture. Processing core 159 may also be suitable for manufacture in one or more process technologies and by being represented on a machine readable media in sufficient detail, may be suitable to facilitate said manufacture.
Processing core 159 comprises an execution unit 142, a set of register file(s) 145, and a decoder 144. Processing core 159 also includes additional circuitry (not shown) which is not necessary to the understanding of embodiments of the present invention. Execution unit 142 is used for executing instructions received by processing core 159. In addition to performing typical processor instructions, execution unit 142 can perform instructions in packed instruction set 143 for performing operations on packed data formats. Packed instruction set 143 includes instructions for performing embodiments of the invention and other packed instructions. Execution unit 142 is coupled to register file 145 by an internal bus. Register file 145 represents a storage area on processing core 159 for storing information, including data. As previously mentioned, it is understood that the storage area used for storing the packed data is not critical. Execution unit 142 is coupled to decoder 144. Decoder 144 is used for decoding instructions received by processing core 159 into control signals and/or microcode entry points. In response to these control signals and/or microcode entry points, execution unit 142 performs the appropriate operations. In one embodiment, the decoder is used to interpret the opcode of the instruction, which will indicate what operation should be performed on the corresponding data indicated within the instruction.
Processing core 159 is coupled with bus 141 for communicating with various other system devices, which may include but are not limited to, for example, synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM) control 146, static random access memory (SRAM) control 147, burst flash memory interface 148, personal computer memory card international association (PCMCIA)/compact flash (CF) card control 149, liquid crystal display (LCD) control 150, direct memory access (DMA) controller 151, and alternative bus master interface 152. In one embodiment, data processing system 140 may also comprise an I/O bridge 154 for communicating with various I/O devices via an I/O bus 153. Such I/O devices may include but are not limited to, for example, universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter (UART) 155, universal serial bus (USB) 156, Bluetooth wireless UART 157 and I/O expansion interface 158.
One embodiment of data processing system 140 provides for mobile, network and/or wireless communications and a processing core 159 capable of performing SIMD operations including a text string comparison operation. Processing core 159 may be programmed with various audio, video, imaging and communications algorithms including discrete transformations such as a Walsh-Hadamard transform, a fast Fourier transform (FFT), a discrete cosine transform (DCT), and their respective inverse transforms; compression/decompression techniques such as color space transformation, video encode motion estimation or video decode motion compensation; and modulation/demodulation (MODEM) functions such as pulse coded modulation (PCM).
For one embodiment, SIMD coprocessor 161 comprises an execution unit 162 and a set of register file(s) 164. One embodiment of main processor 166 comprises a decoder 165 to recognize instructions of instruction set 163 including instructions in accordance with one embodiment for execution by execution unit 162. For alternative embodiments, SIMD coprocessor 161 also comprises at least part of decoder 165B to decode instructions of instruction set 163. Processing core 170 also includes additional circuitry (not shown) which is not necessary to the understanding of embodiments of the present invention.
In operation, the main processor 166 executes a stream of data processing instructions that control data processing operations of a general type including interactions with the cache memory 167, and the input/output system 168. Embedded within the stream of data processing instructions are SIMD coprocessor instructions. The decoder 165 of main processor 166 recognizes these SIMD coprocessor instructions as being of a type that should be executed by an attached SIMD coprocessor 161. Accordingly, the main processor 166 issues these SIMD coprocessor instructions (or control signals representing SIMD coprocessor instructions) on the coprocessor bus 171 where from they are received by any attached SIMD coprocessors. In this case, the SIMD coprocessor 161 will accept and execute any received SIMD coprocessor instructions intended for it.
Data may be received via wireless interface 169 for processing by the SIMD coprocessor instructions. For one example, voice communication may be received in the form of a digital signal, which may be processed by the SIMD coprocessor instructions to regenerate digital audio samples representative of the voice communications. For another example, compressed audio and/or video may be received in the form of a digital bit stream, which may be processed by the SIMD coprocessor instructions to regenerate digital audio samples and/or motion video frames. For one embodiment of processing core 170, main processor 166, and a SIMD coprocessor 161 are integrated into a single processing core 170 comprising an execution unit 162, a set of register file(s) 164, and a decoder 165 to recognize instructions of instruction set 163 including instructions in accordance with one embodiment.
Some instructions are converted into a single micro-op, whereas others need several micro-ops to complete the full operation. In one embodiment, if more than four micro-ops are needed to complete a instruction, the decoder 228 accesses the microcode ROM 232 to do the instruction. For one embodiment, an instruction can be decoded into a small number of micro ops for processing at the instruction decoder 228. In another embodiment, an instruction can be stored within the microcode ROM 232 should a number of micro-ops be needed to accomplish the operation. The trace cache 230 refers to a entry point programmable logic array (PLA) to determine a correct micro-instruction pointer for reading the micro-code sequences to complete one or more instructions in accordance with one embodiment from the micro-code ROM 232. After the microcode ROM 232 finishes sequencing micro-ops for an instruction, the front end 201 of the machine resumes fetching micro-ops from the trace cache 230.
The out-of-order execution engine 203 is where the instructions are prepared for execution. The out-of-order execution logic has a number of buffers to smooth out and reorder the flow of instructions to optimize performance as they go down the pipeline and get scheduled for execution. The allocator logic allocates the machine buffers and resources that each uop needs in order to execute. The register renaming logic renames logic registers onto entries in a register file. The allocator also allocates an entry for each uop in one of the two uop queues, one for memory operations and one for non-memory operations, in front of the instruction schedulers: memory scheduler, fast scheduler 202, slow/general floating point scheduler 204, and simple floating point scheduler 206. The uop schedulers 202, 204, 206, determine when a uop is ready to execute based on the readiness of their dependent input register operand sources and the availability of the execution resources the uops need to complete their operation. The fast scheduler 202 of one embodiment can schedule on each half of the main clock cycle while the other schedulers can only schedule once per main processor clock cycle. The schedulers arbitrate for the dispatch ports to schedule uops for execution.
Register files 208, 210, sit between the schedulers 202, 204, 206, and the execution units 212, 214, 216, 218, 220, 222, 224 in the execution block 211. There is a separate register file 208, 210, for integer and floating point operations, respectively. Each register file 208, 210, of one embodiment also includes a bypass network that can bypass or forward just completed results that have not yet been written into the register file to new dependent uops. The integer register file 208 and the floating point register file 210 are also capable of communicating data with the other. For one embodiment, the integer register file 208 is split into two separate register files, one register file for the low order 32 bits of data and a second register file for the high order 32 bits of data. The floating point register file 210 of one embodiment has 128 bit wide entries because floating point instructions typically have operands from 64 to 128 bits in width.
The execution block 211 contains the execution units 212, 214, 216, 218, 220, 222, 224, where the instructions are actually executed. This section includes the register files 208, 210, that store the integer and floating point data operand values that the micro-instructions need to execute. The processor 200 of one embodiment is comprised of a number of execution units: address generation unit (AGU) 212, AGU 214, fast ALU 216, fast ALU 218, slow ALU 220, floating point ALU 222, floating point move unit 224. For one embodiment, the floating point execution blocks 222, 224, execute floating point, MMX, SIMD, and SSE, or other operations. The floating point ALU 222 of one embodiment includes a 64 bit by 64 bit floating point divider to execute divide, square root, and remainder micro-ops. For embodiments of the present invention, instructions involving a floating point value may be handled with the floating point hardware. In one embodiment, the ALU operations go to the high-speed ALU execution units 216, 218. The fast ALUs 216, 218, of one embodiment can execute fast operations with an effective latency of half a clock cycle. For one embodiment, most complex integer operations go to the slow ALU 220 as the slow ALU 220 includes integer execution hardware for long latency type of operations, such as a multiplier, shifts, flag logic, and branch processing. Memory load/store operations are executed by the AGUs 212, 214. For one embodiment, the integer ALUs 216, 218, 220, are described in the context of performing integer operations on 64 bit data operands. In alternative embodiments, the ALUs 216, 218, 220, can be implemented to support a variety of data bits including 16, 32, 128, 256, etc. Similarly, the floating point units 222, 224, can be implemented to support a range of operands having bits of various widths. For one embodiment, the floating point units 222, 224, can operate on 128 bits wide packed data operands in conjunction with SIMD and multimedia instructions.
In one embodiment, the uops schedulers 202, 204, 206, dispatch dependent operations before the parent load has finished executing. As uops are speculatively scheduled and executed in processor 200, the processor 200 also includes logic to handle memory misses. If a data load misses in the data cache, there can be dependent operations in flight in the pipeline that have left the scheduler with temporarily incorrect data. A replay mechanism tracks and re-executes instructions that use incorrect data. Only the dependent operations need to be replayed and the independent ones are allowed to complete. The schedulers and replay mechanism of one embodiment of a processor are also designed to catch instructions that suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves in a secure enclave page cache.
The term “registers” may refer to the on-board processor storage locations that are used as part of instructions to identify operands. In other words, registers may be those that are usable from the outside of the processor (from a programmer's perspective). However, the registers of an embodiment should not be limited in meaning to a particular type of circuit. Rather, a register of an embodiment is capable of storing and providing data, and performing the functions described herein. The registers described herein can be implemented by circuitry within a processor using any number of different techniques, such as dedicated physical registers, dynamically allocated physical registers using register renaming, combinations of dedicated and dynamically allocated physical registers, etc. In one embodiment, integer registers store thirty-two bit integer data. A register file of one embodiment also contains eight multimedia SIMD registers for packed data. For the discussions below, the registers are understood to be data registers designed to hold packed data, such as 64 bits wide MMX™ registers (also referred to as ‘mm’ registers in some instances) in microprocessors enabled with MMX technology from Intel Corporation of Santa Clara, Calif. These MMX registers, available in both integer and floating point forms, can operate with packed data elements that accompany SIMD and SSE instructions. Similarly, 128 bits wide XMM registers relating to SSE2, SSE3, SSE4, or beyond (referred to generically as “SSEx”) technology can also be used to hold such packed data operands. In one embodiment, in storing packed data and integer data, the registers do not need to differentiate between the two data types. In one embodiment, integer and floating point are either contained in the same register file or different register files. Furthermore, in one embodiment, floating point and integer data may be stored in different registers or the same registers.
In the examples of the following figures, a number of data operands are described.
Generally, a data element is an individual piece of data that is stored in a single register or memory location with other data elements of the same length. In packed data sequences relating to SSEx technology, the number of data elements stored in a XMM register is 128 bits divided by the length in bits of an individual data element. Similarly, in packed data sequences relating to MMX and SSE technology, the number of data elements stored in an MMX register is 64 bits divided by the length in bits of an individual data element. Although the data types illustrated in
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The original x86 instruction set provided for a 1-byte opcode with various formats of address syllable and immediate operand contained in additional bytes whose presence was known from the first “opcode” byte. Additionally, there were certain byte values that were reserved as modifiers to the opcode (called prefixes, as they had to be placed before the instruction). When the original palette of 256 opcode bytes (including these special prefix values) was exhausted, a single byte was dedicated as an escape to a new set of 256 opcodes. As vector instructions (e.g., SIMD) were added, a need for more opcodes was generated, and the “two byte” opcode map also was insufficient, even when expanded through the use of prefixes. To this end, new instructions were added in additional maps which use 2 bytes plus an optional prefix as an identifier.
Additionally, in order to facilitate additional registers in 64-bit mode, an additional prefix may be used (called “REX”) in between the prefixes and the opcode (and any escape bytes necessary to determine the opcode). In one embodiment, the REX may have 4 “payload” bits to indicate use of additional registers in 64-bit mode. In other embodiments it may have fewer or more than 4 bits. The general format of at least one instruction set (which corresponds generally with format 360 and/or format 370) is illustrated generically by the following:
Opcode format 397 corresponds with opcode format 370 and comprises optional VEX prefix bytes 391 (beginning with C4 hex in one embodiment) to replace most other commonly used legacy instruction prefix bytes and escape codes. For example, the following illustrates an embodiment using two fields to encode an instruction, which may be used when a second escape code is present in the original instruction, or when extra bits (e.g, the XB and W fields) in the REX field need to be used. In the embodiment illustrated in
An instruction according to one embodiment may be encoded by one or more of fields 391 and 392. Up to four operand locations per instruction may be identified by field 391 in combination with source operand identifiers 374 and 375 and in combination with an optional scale-index-base (SIB) identifier 393, an optional displacement identifier 394, and an optional immediate byte 395. For one embodiment, VEX prefix bytes 391 may be used to identify 32-bit or 64-bit source and destination operands and/or 128-bit or 256-bit SIMD register or memory operands. For one embodiment, the functionality provided by opcode format 397 may be redundant with opcode format 370, whereas in other embodiments they are different. Opcode formats 370 and 397 allow register to register, memory to register, register by memory, register by register, register by immediate, register to memory addressing specified in part by MOD field 373 and by optional (SIB) identifier 393, an optional displacement identifier 394, and an optional immediate byte 395.
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evex1 RXBmmmmm WvvvLpp evex4 opcode modrm [sib] [disp] [imm]
For one embodiment an instruction encoded according to the EVEX format 398 may have additional “payload” bits that may be used to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves in a secure enclave page cache with additional new features such as, for example, a user configurable mask register, or an additional operand, or selections from among 128-bit, 256-bit or 512-bit vector registers, or more registers from which to select, etc. For example, where VEX format 397 may be used for instructions without a mask, the EVEX format 398 may be used for instructions with an explicit user configurable mask. Additionally, where VEX format 397 may be used for instructions using 128-bit or 256-bit vector registers, EVEX format 398 may be used for instructions using 128-bit, 256-bit, 512-bit or larger (or smaller) vector registers.
Example instructions or commands to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves in a secure enclave page cache are illustrated by the following examples:
Instruction
argument
description
EENTER/
Addr1
Enter the secure enclave, or resume accessing secured
ERESUME
enclave storage corresponding to secure enclave address,
Addr1, and increment the number of logical processors or
hardware threads currently accessing the secure enclave.
EDEXIT/
Addr1
Exit the secure enclave and/or flush one or more translations
AEX
to access secured enclave storage corresponding to secure
enclave address, Addr1, and decrement the number of logical
processors or hardware threads that have concurrently
accessed the secure enclave.
EBLOCK/
Addr1
Mark an entry for the page with page memory address,
EWP/
Addr1, in a secured enclave page mapping as blocked/write-
EWPC
protected to prevent the creation of any new translations to
access/modify the shared page. EWPC clears EWP.
ETRACK/
Addr1
Record the logical processors or hardware threads
EDTRACK
accessing/modifying the page with page memory address,
Addr1, and decrement the number of logical processors or
hardware threads accessing the page as any exit the secure
enclave.
EWRITEBACK/
Addr1
Evict/write-protect, encrypt and write back the page with
EWBX
page memory address, Addr1, if the number of logical
processors or hardware threads accessing a page has been
decremented to zero, or a write-protected page is unmodified.
EWB RESUME/
Addr1
Resume eviction/write-protecting, encrypting and writing
EWBXR
back the page with page memory address, Addr1, after the
previous enclave page writeback operation was interrupted.
EWP TRACK
Addr1
Mark an entry corresponding to the write-protected page with
page memory address, Addr1, in a secured enclave page
mapping as blocked to prevent the creation of any new
translations to modify the page. Record any accesses
modifying the page inside the EPC for Addr1.
ELOAD/
Addr1
Decrypt and authenticate using a version counter in the
ELDX
SDCS if a version array page for the page is bound to the
SDCS, and then load the page with page memory address,
Addr1, into the secure enclave page cache.
ELOAD RESUME/
Addr1
Resume decrypting, authenticating and loading the page with
ELDXR
page memory address, Addr1, into the secure enclave page
cache after the previous enclave page load operation was
interrupted.
EDALLOCX/
Addr1
Allocate/configure a secure domain control structure (SDCS)
EDINIT
for a controlling enclave in a secure storage area at the
effective address, Addr1, inside the EPC, accessible by an
enclave of a management process, and by a domain of secure
enclaves.
EDPTRLD/
Addr1
Load/store an SDCS pointer for a migrated/migrating SDCS
EDPTRST
into/from the processor SDCS pointer register from/to Addr1
EADD/
Addr1
Add/allocate an enclave page/version array page for Addr1,
EPA/
and bind the page/version array page to an SDCS specified
EPAX/
by the processor SDCS pointer register.
RDRAND
Generate a secret to be encrypted using a key bound to the
SDCS.
EGETKEY
Retrieve a key based on cryptographic key material in the
SDCS to encrypt/decrypt a key BLOB (binary large object).
EDQUIESCE/
Quiesce the current SDCS specified by the processor SDCS
EDQ
pointer register in preparation for it to be sealed for
migration.
ECREATE/
Addr1
Allocate a secure enclave control structure (SECS) in the
EDCREATE
EPC to a migrated SDCS secure enclave storage area at the
effective address, Addr1, inside the EPC; initialize the new
SECS structure with a unique enclave identifier; and
optionally record a link in the new SECS structure to the
migrated SECS structure.
EDSTVASLOT/
Addr1
Store/load a version array slot to/from the SDCS from/into a
EDLDVASLOT
version array slot for a last/first version array page at Addr1.
It will be appreciated that through use of the above enclave instructions to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves, the migration process (e.g. where secure enclave page cache memory contents associated with a virtual machine are authenticated, encrypted and written back, the TLB entries are flushed, version counters for pages are recorded for authentication and securely stored, and the virtual machine is migrated to another platform and resumed, etc.) can be broken into stages wherein processor cores or logical processors may continue to execute from read-only pages during one or more stages. If one or more pages are modified, they may be re-authenticated, encrypted and written back, and their version counters incremented. Version array pages may be processed similarly, and version array information is securely transported to the migration platform. Thus performance degradation due to the migration process may be reduced while guaranteeing security of the secure enclave data and without requiring undue complexity and design effort.
According to some embodiments, the example instructions support suspending and resuming migration of enclaves in a secure EPC. An EPC stores a secure domain control structure (SDCS) in storage accessible by an enclave for a management process, and by a domain of enclaves. A processor checks if a corresponding version array (VA) page is bound to the SDCS, and if so: increments a version counter in the SDCS for the page, performs an authenticated encryption of the page from the EPC using the version counter in the SDCS, and writes the encrypted page to external memory (e.g. using an EWRITEBACK or EWBX instruction). A second processor checks if a corresponding VA page is bound to a second SDCS of the second processor, and if so: performs an authenticated decryption of the page using a version counter in the second SDCS, and loads the decrypted page to the EPC in the second processor if authentication passes (e.g. using an ELOAD or ELDX instruction).
Instructions from the above examples can specify addresses for secure storage allocated in the EPC to domain enclaves of a process or processes to store secure enclave control structure data, application data, application code, etc. In some embodiments, a management process enclave (e.g. for a virtual machine manager (VMM) or a secure container) may execute, or cause a system Software Guard Extension (SGX) library to execute instructions (e.g. EPA or EPAX) to bind one or more pages of domain enclaves to the SDCS. A secure storage area may be accessed, by a management process enclave, to write authenticated encrypted copies of the one or more pages from the secure storage area to an external memory (e.g. using EWRITEBACK or EWBX instructions). One or more versions for the one or more pages may be updated, respectively, in version array pages in the secure storage area for the SDCS. Enclaves may continue to execute using pages marked as read-only (e.g. using EWP instructions) while the authenticated encrypted copies of the respective pages are written from the secure storage area to external memory. The secure storage area may also be accessed, by the management process enclave, to write authenticated encrypted copies of the one or more version array pages from the secure storage area to external memory. A version array slot for a last version array page may be stored into the SDCS (e.g. using an EDSTVASLOT instruction) for authentication of a migrated image of the secure enclaves. The SDCS may then be shutdown, deactivated or “quiesced,” by the management process enclave, and a corresponding attribute field in the SDCS may be set to indicate that the SDCS is quiesced (e.g. using an EDQUIESCE or EDQ instruction). A trusted migration enclave may then, verify that the SDCS is quiesced, and seal the SDCS (e.g. using RDRAND and EGETKEY instructions) in an authenticated encrypted persistent data structure, placing it in external non-volatile memory for migration, and the management process enclave may then deallocate the original SDCS.
In some embodiments, another trusted migration enclave (e.g. on another platform) may execute, or cause a system Software Guard Extension (SGX) library to execute instructions to access external memory to retrieve such an authenticated encrypted persistent data structure for migration of the secure enclaves to the new platform. The sealed SDCS from the authenticated encrypted persistent data structure is decrypted and authenticated (e.g. using an EGETKEY instruction), and it is verified that security policies in the meta-data permit secure enclaves associated with the virtual machine to be resumed. Accordingly, a secure enclave control structure (SECS) for the migrated SDCS is allocated (e.g. using an ECREATE or EDCREATE instruction) for the virtual machine by the trusted migration enclave, and a local ID for the virtual machine is assigned. The migrated SDCS may then be configured (e.g. using an EDINIT instruction) from the sealed SDCS persistent data structure, and another management process enclave (e.g. for a virtual machine manager or a secure container on another platform) may load an SDCS pointer for the migrated SDCS into a processor register (e.g. using an EDPTRLD instruction) of the new platform. A version array slot is loaded from the SDCS into a version array slot for a first version array page (e.g. using an EDLDVASLOT instruction). Copies of the one or more version array pages may then be loaded from the external memory, decrypted and authenticated, while checking versions of the one or more version array pages against versions in the migrated SDCS (e.g. using ELOAD or ELDX instructions). Copies of the one or more enclave pages may then be loaded from the external memory, decrypted and authenticated, while checking versions of the one or more enclave pages against versions in the migrated SDCS.
In some embodiments, instructions and logic herein disclosed are able to be interrupted and resumed in migrating secure domain processes, and in page copying operations from within secure enclaves. Therefore forward progress of migrating secure domain processes and establishing authenticated copies of pages for secure enclaves may guaranteed, and unacceptable glitches in services may be avoided by timely servicing pending interrupts. It will be appreciated that through the use of such enclave instructions to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves in a secure EPC, secure enclave page cache memory contents associated with a virtual machine may be authenticated, encrypted and written back, the TLB entries may be flushed, version counters for pages may be recorded for authentication and securely stored, and the virtual machine can be migrated to another platform and resumed. The migration process can be broken into stages wherein processor cores or logical processors may continue to execute from read-only pages during one or more stages. If one or more pages are modified, they may be re-authenticated, encrypted and written back, and their version counters incremented. Version array pages may be processed similarly, and version array information can be securely transported to the migration platform. Thus performance degradation due to the migration process may be reduced while guaranteeing security of the secure enclave data and without requiring undue complexity and design effort. It will be appreciated that at any such time that versions do not match and/or authentication fails for the migrated secure domain, the migration process may be suspended in the target platform, and the originating platform may be signaled to resume the migration process beginning at the point which was the cause of failure, such that the offending pages may be re-authenticated, encrypted and written back, and their version counters incremented. Thus the secure migration process provides, not only for detection and prevention of corruption and/or tampering, but also for recovery after such a detection and resumption of the migration process in the originating platform. It will also be appreciated that without processor support for such instructions, any software system security features to accomplish the same (or similar) technical effects may (if at all feasible) be prohibitively expensive and/or performance limiting to an extent that some lesser measure of security may be accepted disadvantageously.
It will also be appreciated that managing permissions, physical memory and/or changing mappings may still be managed by an OS, but when the memory contents are protected, as in a secure enclave, the OS is not permitted or trusted to access the actual protected contents of the enclave private memory. Guaranteeing the security and/or integrity of private memory contents and managing the technical constraints of migrating secure domain processes and establishing secure authenticated copies of secure domain pages, without being able to trust an OS, can be accomplished using instructions and processing logic to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves in a secure enclave page cache, without requiring elaborate hardware support and/or design effort.
In
In
The core 490 may be a reduced instruction set computing (RISC) core, a complex instruction set computing (CISC) core, a very long instruction word (VLIW) core, or a hybrid or alternative core type. As yet another option, the core 490 may be a special-purpose core, such as, for example, a network or communication core, compression engine, graphics core, or the like.
The front end unit 430 includes a branch prediction unit 432 coupled to an instruction cache unit 434, which is coupled to an instruction translation lookaside buffer (TLB) 436, which is coupled to an instruction fetch unit 438, which is coupled to a decode unit 440. The decode unit or decoder may decode instructions, and generate as an output one or more micro-operations, micro-code entry points, microinstructions, other instructions, or other control signals, which are decoded from, or which otherwise reflect, or are derived from, the original instructions. The decoder may be implemented using various different mechanisms. Examples of suitable mechanisms include, but are not limited to, look-up tables, hardware implementations, programmable logic arrays (PLAs), microcode read only memories (ROMs), etc. The instruction cache unit 434 is further coupled to a level 2 (L2) cache unit 476 in the memory unit 470. The decode unit 440 is coupled to a rename/allocator unit 452 in the execution engine unit 450.
The execution engine unit 450 includes the rename/allocator unit 452 coupled to a retirement unit 454 and a set of one or more scheduler unit(s) 456. The scheduler unit(s) 456 represents any number of different schedulers, including reservations stations, central instruction window, etc. The scheduler unit(s) 456 is coupled to the physical register file(s) units) 458. Each of the physical register file(s) units 458 represents one or more physical register files, different ones of which store one or more different data types, such as scalar integer, scalar floating point, packed integer, packed floating point, vector integer, vector floating point, etc., status (e.g., an instruction pointer that is the address of the next instruction to be executed), etc. The physical register file(s) unit(s) 458 is overlapped by the retirement unit 454 to illustrate various ways in which register renaming and out-of-order execution may be implemented (e.g., using a reorder buffer(s) and a retirement register file(s), using a future file(s), a history buffer(s), and a retirement register file(s); using a register maps and a pool of registers; etc.). Generally, the architectural registers are visible from the outside of the processor or from a programmer's perspective. The registers are not limited to any known particular type of circuit. Various different types of registers are suitable as long as they are capable of storing and providing data as described herein. Examples of suitable registers include, but are not limited to, dedicated physical registers, dynamically allocated physical registers using register renaming, combinations of dedicated and dynamically allocated physical registers, etc. The retirement unit 454 and the physical register file(s) unit(s) 458 are coupled to the execution cluster(s) 460. The execution cluster(s) 460 includes a set of one or more execution units 462 and a set of one or more memory access units 464. The execution units 462 may perform various operations (e.g., shifts, addition, subtraction, multiplication) and on various types of data (e.g., scalar floating point, packed integer, packed floating point, vector integer, vector floating point). While some embodiments may include a number of execution units dedicated to specific functions or sets of functions, other embodiments may include only one execution unit or multiple execution units that all perform all functions. The scheduler unit(s) 456, physical register file(s) unit(s) 458, and execution cluster(s) 460 are shown as being possibly plural because certain embodiments create separate pipelines for certain types of data/operations (e.g., a scalar integer pipeline, a scalar floating point/packed integer/packed floating point/vector integer/vector floating point pipeline, and/or a memory access pipeline that each have their own scheduler unit, physical register file(s) unit, and/or execution cluster, and in the case of a separate memory access pipeline, certain embodiments are implemented in which only the execution cluster of this pipeline has the memory access unit(s) 464). It should also be understood that where separate pipelines are used, one or more of these pipelines may be out-of-order issue/execution and the rest in-order.
The set of memory access units 464 is coupled to the memory unit 470, which includes a data TLB unit 472 coupled to a data cache unit 474 coupled to a level 2 (L2) cache unit 476. In one exemplary embodiment, the memory access units 464 may include a load unit, a store address unit, and a store data unit, each of which is coupled to the data TLB unit 472 in the memory unit 470. The L2 cache unit 476 is coupled to one or more other levels of cache and eventually to a main memory.
By way of example, the exemplary register renaming, out-of-order issue/execution core architecture may implement the pipeline 400 as follows: 1) the instruction fetch 438 performs the fetch and length decoding stages 402 and 404; 2) the decode unit 440 performs the decode stage 406; 3) the rename/allocator unit 452 performs the allocation stage 408 and renaming stage 410; 4) the scheduler unit(s) 456 performs the schedule stage 412; 5) the physical register file(s) unit(s) 458 and the memory unit 470 perform the register read/memory read stage 414; the execution cluster 460 perform the execute stage 416; 6) the memory unit 470 and the physical register file(s) unit(s) 458 perform the write back/memory write stage 418; 7) various units may be involved in the exception handling stage 422; and 8) the retirement unit 454 and the physical register file(s) unit(s) 458 perform the commit stage 424.
The core 490 may support one or more instructions sets (e.g., the x86 instruction set (with some extensions that have been added with newer versions); the MIPS instruction set of MIPS Technologies of Sunnyvale, Calif.; the ARM instruction set (with optional additional extensions such as NEON) of ARM Holdings of Sunnyvale, Calif.).
It should be understood that the core may support multithreading (executing two or more parallel sets of operations or threads), and may do so in a variety of ways including time sliced multithreading, simultaneous multithreading (where a single physical core provides a logical core for each of the threads that physical core is simultaneously multithreading), or a combination thereof (e.g., time sliced fetching and decoding and simultaneous multithreading thereafter such as in the Intel® Hyperthreading technology).
While register renaming is described in the context of out-of-order execution, it should be understood that register renaming may be used in an in-order architecture. While the illustrated embodiment of the processor also includes a separate instruction and data cache units 434/474 and a shared L2 cache unit 476, alternative embodiments may have a single internal cache for both instructions and data, such as, for example, a Level 1 (L1) internal cache, or multiple levels of internal cache. In some embodiments, the system may include a combination of an internal cache and an external cache that is external to the core and/or the processor. Alternatively, all of the cache may be external to the core and/or the processor.
The memory hierarchy includes one or more levels of cache within the cores, a set or one or more shared cache units 506, and external memory (not shown) coupled to the set of integrated memory controller units 514. The set of shared cache units 506 may include one or more mid-level caches, such as level 2 (L2), level 3 (L3), level 4 (L4), or other levels of cache, a last level cache (LLC), and/or combinations thereof. While in one embodiment a ring based interconnect unit 512 interconnects the integrated graphics logic 508, the set of shared cache units 506, and the system agent unit 510, alternative embodiments may use any number of well-known techniques for interconnecting such units.
In some embodiments, one or more of the cores 502A-N are capable of multithreading. The system agent 510 includes those components coordinating and operating cores 502A-N. The system agent unit 510 may include for example a power control unit (PCU) and a display unit. The PCU may be or include logic and components needed for regulating the power state of the cores 502A-N and the integrated graphics logic 508. The display unit is for driving one or more externally connected displays.
The cores 502A-N may be homogenous or heterogeneous in terms of architecture and/or instruction set. For example, some of the cores 502A-N may be in order while others are out-of-order. As another example, two or more of the cores 502A-N may be capable of execution the same instruction set, while others may be capable of executing only a subset of that instruction set or a different instruction set.
The processor may be a general-purpose processor, such as a Core™ i3, i5, i7, 2 Duo and Quad, Xeon™, Itanium™, XScale™ or StrongARM™ processor, which are available from Intel Corporation, of Santa Clara, Calif. Alternatively, the processor may be from another company, such as ARM Holdings, Ltd, MIPS, etc. The processor may be a special-purpose processor, such as, for example, a network or communication processor, compression engine, graphics processor, co-processor, embedded processor, or the like. The processor may be implemented on one or more chips. The processor 500 may be a part of and/or may be implemented on one or more substrates using any of a number of process technologies, such as, for example, BiCMOS, CMOS, or NMOS.
Referring now to
Each processor 610,615 may be some version of the processor 500. However, it should be noted that it is unlikely that integrated graphics logic and integrated memory control units would exist in the processors 610,615.
The GMCH 620 may be a chipset, or a portion of a chipset. The GMCH 620 may communicate with the processor(s) 610, 615 and control interaction between the processor(s) 610, 615 and memory 640. The GMCH 620 may also act as an accelerated bus interface between the processor(s) 610, 615 and other elements of the system 600. For at least one embodiment, the GMCH 620 communicates with the processor(s) 610, 615 via a multi-drop bus, such as a frontside bus (FSB) 695.
Furthermore, GMCH 620 is coupled to a display 645 (such as a flat panel display). GMCH 620 may include an integrated graphics accelerator. GMCH 620 is further coupled to an input/output (I/O) controller hub (ICH) 650, which may be used to couple various peripheral devices to system 600. Shown for example in the embodiment of
Alternatively, additional or different processors may also be present in the system 600. For example, additional processor(s) 615 may include additional processors(s) that are the same as processor 610, additional processor(s) that are heterogeneous or asymmetric to processor 610, accelerators (such as, e.g., graphics accelerators or digital signal processing (DSP) units), field programmable gate arrays, or any other processor. There can be a variety of differences between the physical resources 610, 615 in terms of a spectrum of metrics of merit including architectural, micro-architectural, thermal, power consumption characteristics, and the like. These differences may effectively manifest themselves as asymmetry and heterogeneity amongst the processors 610, 615. For at least one embodiment, the various processors 610, 615 may reside in the same die package.
Referring now to
While shown with only two processors 770, 780, it is to be understood that the scope of the present invention is not so limited. In other embodiments, one or more additional processors may be present in a given processor.
Processors 770 and 780 are shown including integrated memory controller units 772 and 782, respectively. Processor 770 also includes as part of its bus controller units point-to-point (P-P) interfaces 776 and 778; similarly, second processor 780 includes P-P interfaces 786 and 788. Processors 770, 780 may exchange information via a point-to-point (P-P) interface 750 using P-P interface circuits 778, 788. As shown in
Processors 770, 780 may each exchange information with a chipset 790 via individual P-P interfaces 752, 754 using point to point interface circuits 776, 794, 786, 798. Chipset 790 may also exchange information with a high-performance graphics circuit 738 via a high-performance graphics interface 739.
A shared cache (not shown) may be included in either processor or outside of both processors, yet connected with the processors via P-P interconnect, such that either or both processors' local cache information may be stored in the shared cache if a processor is placed into a low power mode.
Chipset 790 may be coupled to a first bus 716 via an interface 796. In one embodiment, first bus 716 may be a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus, or a bus such as a PCI Express bus or another third generation I/O interconnect bus, although the scope of the present invention is not so limited.
As shown in
Referring now to
Referring now to
In some embodiments, instructions that benefit from highly parallel, throughput processors may be performed by the GPU, while instructions that benefit from the performance of processors that benefit from deeply pipelined architectures may be performed by the CPU. For example, graphics, scientific applications, financial applications and other parallel workloads may benefit from the performance of the GPU and be executed accordingly, whereas more sequential applications, such as operating system kernel or application code may be better suited for the CPU.
In
One or more aspects of at least one embodiment may be implemented by representative data stored on a machine-readable medium which represents various logic within the processor, which when read by a machine causes the machine to fabricate logic to perform the techniques described herein. Such representations, known as “IP cores” may be stored on a tangible, machine readable medium (“tape”) and supplied to various customers or manufacturing facilities to load into the fabrication machines that actually make the logic or processor. For example, IP cores, such as the Cortex™ family of processors developed by ARM Holdings, Ltd. and Loongson IP cores developed the Institute of Computing Technology (ICT) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences may be licensed or sold to various customers or licensees, such as Texas Instruments, Qualcomm, Apple, or Samsung and implemented in processors produced by these customers or licensees.
In some embodiments, one or more instructions may correspond to a first type or architecture (e.g., x86) and be translated or emulated on a processor of a different type or architecture (e.g., ARM). An instruction, according to one embodiment, may therefore be performed on any processor or processor type, including ARM, x86, MIPS, a GPU, or other processor type or architecture.
It will be appreciated that through use of enclave instructions to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves, the migration process (e.g. where secure enclave page cache memory contents associated with a virtual machine are authenticated, encrypted and written back, the TLB entries are flushed, version counters for pages are recorded for authentication and securely stored, and the virtual machine is migrated to another platform and resumed, etc.) can be broken into stages wherein processor cores or logical processors may continue to execute from read-only pages during one or more stages. If one or more pages are modified, they may be re-authenticated, encrypted and written back, and their version counters incremented. Version array pages may be processed similarly, and version array information is securely transported to the migration platform. Thus performance degradation due to the migration process may be reduced while guaranteeing security of the secure enclave data and without requiring undue complexity and design effort.
Processor core 1401 also comprises a TLB 1425 in which translations may be installed to access the EPC 1420. Processor core 1401 also comprises a decode stage 1422, a read stage 1424, one or more execution units (e.g. execution unit 1426), and a write stage 1428. Embodiments of processor core 1401 may also comprise other pipeline stages (e.g. as shown in pipeline 400) for execution of enclave instructions 1403 to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves in a secure enclave page cache, EPC 1420.
In one embodiment enclave instructions 1403 support suspending and resuming migration of enclaves in secure EPC 1420 by providing for the pages 1442 and 1443 to be authenticated, encrypted and written to external memory 1450 and transferred or migrated to another platform. Enclave instructions 1403 also support the SDCS 1441 itself being authenticated, encrypted and written to external memory 1450 so that it may be securely transferred to another platform and restarted. The EPC 1420 stores the active SDCS 1441 in storage accessible by an enclave for a management process, and by a domain set of secure enclaves. For example, processor 1401 may authenticate, encrypt and write to external memory 1450, page 1443 using EWBX instruction 1436. Processor 1401 checks if a corresponding version array (VA) page 1442 is bound to the SDCS pointed to by SDCS PTR 1419, and if so: increments a version counter in the SDCS 1441 for the page 1443, performs an authenticated encryption of the page 1443 from the EPC 1420 using the version counter in the SDCS 1441, and writes the encrypted page to external memory. After the page 1443 is securely transferred to another platform, a second processor will perform the opposite operations, checking if a corresponding VA page is bound to a second SDCS of the second processor, and if so: performing an authenticated decryption of the page 1441 using a version counter in the second SDCS, and loading the decrypted page to an EPC in the second processor if authentication passes (e.g. using an ELOAD or ELDX instruction).
By way of another example, processor 1401 may originate a migration process wherein SDCS 1441 is allocated to a controlling enclave using an EDALLOCX instruction 1431 and SDCS 1441 is configured (e.g. using one or more EDINIT instructions, etc.) for a first secure enclave. One or more pages 1442 and 1443 of the first secure enclave can be bound to SDCS 1441 using one or more EPAX instruction 1433. Then authenticated encrypted copies of the one or more pages 1443 may be written from the first secure storage area EPC 1420 to external memory 1450 using an EWBX instruction 1436. One or more versions for one or more pages 1443, may be updated in one or more version array pages 1442 as a result of an EWBX instruction 1436, in the secure storage area for the SDCS 1441. It will be appreciated that enclaves may continue to execute using pages marked as read-only (e.g. using EWP/EWPC instructions 1435) while the respective pages 1442 and 1443 are authenticated, encrypted and copies of the respective pages are written from the secure storage area EPC 1420 to external memory 1450. If at any time one or more of the domain enclaves need to modify pages 1442 and/or 1443, the write protection may be removed or cleared (e.g. using EWP/EWPC instructions 1435), the migration process may be suspended, and then later resumed beginning at the page or pages, which needed such modification. Any domain enclaves needing to modify pages 1442 and/or 1443 may be tracked responsive to an EDTRACK instruction 1434. Authenticated encrypted copies of one or more version array pages 1442 may also be written from the secure storage area EPC 1420 to the external memory 1450 using EWBX instructions 1436. A version array slot may be saved in SDCS 1441 (e.g. using an EDSTVASLOT instruction 1432, or similar instruction). Domain enclave processes may exit the secure enclave using an EEXIT instruction 1437. Then SDCS 1441 may be quiesced and a corresponding attribute field in SDCS 1441 may be set to indicate that SDCS 1441 is quiesced (e.g. using EDQ instruction 1438). The SDCS 1441 may be sealed in an authenticated encrypted persistent structure (e.g. using RDRAND and EGETKEY instructions, or other similar instructions). The authenticated encrypted persistent structure may be stored to external memory 1450 for migration. A management process enclave may then deallocate SDCS 1441 and the sealed structure may be securely transferred and migrated to another platform.
In some embodiments, another trusted migration enclave (e.g. on another platform) may execute, or cause a system Software Guard Extension (SGX) library to execute instructions to access external memory to retrieve such an authenticated encrypted persistent data structure for migration of the secure enclaves to the new platform. The sealed SDCS from the authenticated encrypted persistent data structure is decrypted and authenticated (e.g. using an EGETKEY instruction), and it is verified that security policies in the meta-data permit secure enclaves associated with the virtual machine to be resumed. It will be appreciated that at any time that versions do not match and/or authentication fails for a migrated secure domain in a target platform, a migration process may be suspended in the target platform, and the originating processor 1401 may be signaled to resume the migration process beginning at the point which was the cause of failure.
Processor core 1501 also comprises a TLB 1525 in which translations may be installed to access the EPC 1520. Processor core 1501 also comprises a decode stage 1522, a read stage 1524, one or more execution units (e.g. execution unit 1526), and a write stage 1528. Embodiments of processor core 1501 may also comprise other pipeline stages (e.g. as shown in pipeline 400) for execution of enclave instructions 1503 to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves in a secure enclave page cache, EPC 1520.
In one embodiment enclave instructions 1503 support suspending and resuming migration of enclaves in secure EPC 1520 by providing for the pages 1542 and 1543 to be transferred or migrated from another platform and retrieved from external memory 1550 then decrypted and authenticated. Importantly, enclave instructions 1503 support the SDCS 1541 itself being securely transferred or migrated from another platform and retrieved from external memory 1550 then decrypted, authenticated and restarted. The EPC 1520 stores the migrated SDCS 1541 in storage accessible by another enclave for a management process on the target platform, and by the domain set of migrated secure enclaves. For example, processor 1501 may retrieve page 1543 from external memory 1550 then decrypt and authenticate it using ELOAD (or ELDX) instruction 1536. Processor 1501 checks if a corresponding VA page 1542 is bound to the SDCS pointed to by SDCS PTR 1519, and if so: performs an authenticated decryption, using the version counter in said SDCS 1541, of the page 1542 from external memory 1550 operatively coupled with processor 1501, and loads a decrypted copy of page 1443 to the EPC 1520 if authentication of the authenticated decryption passes.
By way of another example, processor 1501 may complete a migration process wherein external memory 1550 is accessed to retrieve an authenticated encrypted persistent data structure. A sealed SDCS 1441 may decrypted and authenticated from the encrypted persistent data structure. A secure enclave control structure (SECS) may be allocated for a migrated SDCS 1541 using ECREATE instruction 1531. The migrated SDCS 1541 is configured from the sealed SDCS 1441 (e.g. using EDINIT instructions 1533, or other instructions). An SDCS pointer for the migrated SDCS 1541 may be loaded into a processor register, SDCS PTR 1519 using EDPTRLD instruction 1534. A version array slot from the SDCS 1541 is recovered for a version array slot for a first version array page 1542 of one or more version array pages (e.g. using an EDLDVASLOT instruction 1532). A key for decrypting may be obtained from the SDCS 1541 using an EGETKEY instruction 1538, or similar instruction. Copies of the one or more version array pages 1542 may be loaded from external memory 1550 to secure storage, EPC 1520, decrypted and authenticated (e.g. using ELOAD instructions 1536, or some similar instruction). Versions of the one or more version array pages 1542 are checked against versions in the migrated SDCS 1541 (e.g. as a result of an ELOAD instruction 1536, or similar instruction). Copies of the one or more data pages 1543 of the secure enclave are loaded from external memory 1550 to secure storage EPC 1520, decrypted and authenticated, while continuing to check versions of the one or more enclave pages 1543 against versions in the migrated SDCS 1541. Migrated domain enclave processes may enter the secure enclave using an EENTER instruction 1537. It will be appreciated that at any time that versions do not match and/or authentication fails for the migrated secure domain, the migration process may be suspended in the target platform processor 1501, and the originating platform (e.g. processor 1401) may be signaled to resume the migration process beginning at the point which was the cause of failure.
In processing block 1605 of process 1601, a secure domain control structure (SDCS) is allocated to a controlling enclave (e.g. using an EDALLOCX instruction, or some other similar instruction). In processing block 1610, the SDCS for a first secure enclave is configured (e.g. using one or more EDINIT instructions, etc.). In processing block 1615, one or more pages of the first secure enclave are bound to the SDCS (e.g. using one or more EPA or EPAX instructions). In processing block 1620, authenticated encrypted copies of the one or more pages are written from the first secure storage area to an external memory (e.g. using an EWRITEBACK or EWBX instruction, or some other similar instruction). In processing block 1625, one or more versions for the one or more pages, respectively, are updated in one or more version array pages (e.g. as a result of an EWRITEBACK or EWBX instruction, or similar instruction) in the first secure storage area for the SDCS (or in the SDCS itself). It will be appreciated that enclaves may continue to execute using pages marked as read-only (e.g. using EWP instructions) while the respective pages are authenticated, encrypted and copies of the respective pages are written from the secure storage area to external memory. If at any time one or more of the domain enclaves need to modify such pages, the write protection may be removed or cleared (e.g. using EWPC instructions), the migration process 1601 may be suspended, and then later resumed beginning at the page or pages, which needed such modification. In processing block 1630, authenticated encrypted copies of the one or more version array pages are written from the first secure storage area to the external memory (e.g. using an EWRITEBACK or EWBX instruction, or similar instruction). In processing block 1635, a version array slot is saved in the SDCS (e.g. using an EDSTVASLOT instruction, or some other similar instruction). In processing block 1640, the SDCS is quiesced and a corresponding attribute field in the SDCS is set to indicate that the SDCS is quiesced (e.g. using an EDQUIESCE or EDQ instruction). In processing block 1645, the SDCS is sealed in an authenticated encrypted persistent structure (e.g. using RDRAND and EGETKEY instructions, or some other similar instruction). In processing block 1650, the authenticated encrypted persistent structure is stored to the external non-volatile memory for migration. A management process enclave may then deallocate the SDCS and the sealed structure may be securely transferred and migrated to another platform. It will be appreciated that at any time that versions do not match and/or authentication fails for a migrated secure domain in a target platform, a migration process 1701 may be suspended in the target platform, and the originating platform may be signaled to resume the migration process 1601 beginning at the point which was the cause of failure.
It will be further appreciated that while the processing blocks of process 1601 and other processes herein disclosed are illustrated as being executed in an iterative fashion, execution in alternative orders, or concurrently, or in parallel may preferably be performed whenever possible.
It will also be appreciated that through use of the above enclave instructions to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves, the migration process (e.g. where secure enclave page cache memory contents associated with a virtual machine are authenticated, encrypted and written back, the TLB entries are flushed, version counters for pages are recorded for authentication and securely stored, and the virtual machine is migrated to another platform and resumed, etc.) can be broken into stages wherein processor cores or logical processors may continue to execute from read-only pages during one or more stages. If one or more pages are modified, they may be re-authenticated, encrypted and written back, and their version counters incremented. Version array pages may be processed similarly, and version array information is securely transported to the migration platform. Thus performance degradation due to the migration process may be reduced while guaranteeing security of the secure enclave data and without requiring undue complexity and design effort.
According to some embodiments, the instructions disclosed herein support suspending and resuming migration of enclaves in a secure EPC. An EPC stores a secure domain control structure (SDCS) in storage accessible by an enclave for a management process, and by a domain of enclaves. A processor checks if a corresponding version array (VA) page is bound to the SDCS, and if so: increments a version counter in the SDCS for the page, performs an authenticated encryption of the page from the EPC using the version counter in the SDCS, and writes the encrypted page to external memory (e.g. using an EWRITEBACK or EWBX instruction). A second processor checks if a corresponding VA page is bound to a second SDCS of the second processor, and if so: performs an authenticated decryption of the page using a version counter in the second SDCS, and loads the decrypted page to the EPC in the second processor if authentication passes (e.g. using an ELOAD or ELDX instruction).
It will also be appreciated that processing blocks illustrated as being executed in a particular order may also be executed in another order, or concurrently, or in parallel with each other, if possible in some alternative embodiments of process 1701 and in other processes herein disclosed.
In some embodiments, instructions and logic herein disclosed are able to be interrupted and resumed in migrating secure domain processes, and in page copying operations from within secure enclaves. Therefore forward progress of migrating secure domain processes and establishing authenticated copies of pages for secure enclaves may guaranteed, and unacceptable glitches in services such as voice, video and real-time transactions may be avoided by timely servicing pending interrupts. It will be appreciated that through the use of such enclave instructions to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves in a secure EPC, secure enclave page cache memory contents associated with a virtual machine may be authenticated, encrypted and written back, the TLB entries may be flushed, version counters for pages may be recorded for authentication and securely stored, and the virtual machine can be migrated to another platform and resumed. The migration process can be broken into stages wherein processor cores or logical processors may continue to execute from read-only pages during one or more stages. If one or more pages are modified, they may be re-authenticated, encrypted and written back, and their version counters incremented. Version array pages may be processed similarly, and version array information can be securely transported to the migration platform. Thus performance degradation due to the migration process may be reduced while guaranteeing security of the secure enclave data and without requiring undue complexity and design effort. It will also be appreciated that without processor support for such instructions, any software system security features to accomplish the same (or similar) technical effects may (if at all feasible) be prohibitively expensive and/or performance limiting to an extent that some lesser measure of security may be accepted disadvantageously.
It will also be appreciated that managing permissions, physical memory and/or changing mappings may still be managed by an OS, but when the memory contents are protected, as in a secure enclave, the OS is not permitted or trusted to access the actual protected contents of the enclave private memory. Guaranteeing the security and/or integrity of private memory contents and managing the technical constraints of migrating secure domain processes and establishing secure authenticated copies of secure domain pages, without being able to trust an OS, can be accomplished using instructions and processing logic to suspend and resume migration of secure enclaves in a secure enclave page cache, without requiring elaborate hardware support and/or design effort.
Embodiments of the mechanisms disclosed herein may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or a combination of such implementation approaches. Embodiments of the invention may be implemented as computer programs or program code executing on programmable systems comprising at least one processor, a storage system (including volatile and non-volatile memory and/or storage elements), at least one input device, and at least one output device.
Program code may be applied to input instructions to perform the functions described herein and generate output information. The output information may be applied to one or more output devices, in known fashion. For purposes of this application, a processing system includes any system that has a processor, such as, for example; a digital signal processor (DSP), a microcontroller, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or a microprocessor.
The program code may be implemented in a high level procedural or object oriented programming language to communicate with a processing system. The program code may also be implemented in assembly or machine language, if desired. In fact, the mechanisms described herein are not limited in scope to any particular programming language. In any case, the language may be a compiled or interpreted language.
One or more aspects of at least one embodiment may be implemented by representative instructions stored on a machine-readable medium which represents various logic within the processor, which when read by a machine causes the machine to fabricate logic to perform the techniques described herein. Such representations, known as “IP cores” may be stored on a tangible, machine readable medium and supplied to various customers or manufacturing facilities to load into the fabrication machines that actually make the logic or processor.
Such machine-readable storage media may include, without limitation, non-transitory, tangible arrangements of articles manufactured or formed by a machine or device, including storage media such as hard disks, any other type of disk including floppy disks, optical disks, compact disk read-only memories (CD-ROMs), compact disk rewritable's (CD-RWs), and magneto-optical disks, semiconductor devices such as read-only memories (ROMs), random access memories (RAMs) such as dynamic random access memories (DRAMs), static random access memories (SRAMs), erasable programmable read-only memories (EPROMs), flash memories, electrically erasable programmable read-only memories (EEPROMs), magnetic or optical cards, or any other type of media suitable for storing electronic instructions.
Accordingly, embodiments of the invention also include non-transitory, tangible machine-readable media containing instructions or containing design data, such as Hardware Description Language (HDL), which defines structures, circuits, apparatuses, processors and/or system features described herein. Such embodiments may also be referred to as program products.
In some cases, an instruction converter may be used to convert an instruction from a source instruction set to a target instruction set. For example, the instruction converter may translate (e.g., using static binary translation, dynamic binary translation including dynamic compilation), morph, emulate, or otherwise convert an instruction to one or more other instructions to be processed by the core. The instruction converter may be implemented in software, hardware, firmware, or a combination thereof. The instruction converter may be on processor, off processor, or part on and part off processor.
Thus, techniques for performing one or more instructions according to at least one embodiment are disclosed. While certain exemplary embodiments have been described and shown in the accompanying drawings, it is to be understood that such embodiments are merely illustrative of and not restrictive on the broad invention, and that this invention not be limited to the specific constructions and arrangements shown and described, since various other modifications may occur to those ordinarily skilled in the art upon studying this disclosure. In an area of technology such as this, where growth is fast and further advancements are not easily foreseen, the disclosed embodiments may be readily modifiable in arrangement and detail as facilitated by enabling technological advancements without departing from the principles of the present disclosure or the scope of the accompanying claims.
Neiger, Gilbert, Shanbhogue, Vedvyas, Vij, Mona, Scarlata, Vincent R., Anati, Ittai, Leslie-Hurd, Rebekah, Rozas, Carlos V., Johnson, Simon P., Mckeen, Francis X., Alexandrovich, Ilya, Zmudzinski, Krystof C., Chakrabarti, Somnath
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