A method and an apparatus for executing codes embedded inside a device to verify a code image loaded in a memory of the device are described. A code image may be executed after being verified as a trusted code image. The embedded codes may be stored in a secure rom (read only memory) chip of the device. In one embodiment, the verification of the code image is based on a key stored within the secure rom chip. The key may be unique to each device. Access to the key may be controlled by the associated secure rom chip. The device may complete establishing an operating environment subsequent to executing the verified code image.
|
1. A computer implemented method, comprising:
receiving, by a device, a first code image from a host;
in response to receiving the first code image, executing code stored in a read only memory (rom) of the device to certify the first code image according to a chain of certificates and based upon a fingerprint of a root certificate stored in the rom;
deriving, by the device, a signature from the first code image using a key stored within the rom when the first code image is certified;
signing, by the device, the signature into a first header of the first code image;
loading the first code image into a main memory of the device;
verifying, at the device, the signature in the first header of the loaded first code image using the key stored within the rom and without using the certificates; and
in response to successfully verifying the signature of the loaded first code image, executing the verified first code image from the main memory of the device.
9. A machine-readable non-transitory storage medium having instructions, which when executed by a machine, cause a machine to perform a method, the method comprising:
receiving, by a device, a first code image from a host;
in response to receiving the first code image, executing code stored in a read only memory (rom) of the device to certify the first code image according to a chain of certificates and based upon a fingerprint of a root certificate stored in the rom;
deriving, by the device, a signature from the first code image using a key stored within the rom when the first code image is certified;
signing, by the device, the signature as a first header of the first code image;
loading the first code image into a main memory of the device;
verifying, at the device, the signature in the first header of the loaded first code image using a key stored within the rom and without using the certificates; and
in response to successfully verifying the signature of the loaded first code image, executing the verified first code image from the main memory of the device to establish an operating environment for the device.
17. An electronic device, comprising:
a read only memory (rom) to store executable code, a key identifying the electronic device, and a fingerprint of a root certificate;
a mass storage;
a main memory; and
a processor coupled to the rom, the mass storage, and the main memory,
wherein the processor is configured to cause the electronic device
to receive a first code image from a host,
to execute, in response to receiving a first code image, the executable code stored in the rom to certify the first code image according to a chain of certificates and based upon the fingerprint of the root certificate in the rom,
to derive a signature from the first code image using the key stored within the rom when the first code image is certified;
to sign the signature into a first header of the first code image,
to load the first code image from the mass storage into the main memory,
to verify the signature in the first header of the loaded first code image using the key, and upon successfully verifying the signature of the first code image according to the first header of the first code image without using the certificates,
to execute the verified first code image from the main memory to establish an operating environment of the electronic device.
2. The method of
deriving a hash value from the first code image; and
encrypting the hash value into the signature based on the key.
3. The method of
storing the first code image in the device including the signature in the first header.
4. The method of
deriving a second signature from the second code image using the key, wherein the second signature fails to match the second header.
7. The method of
8. The method of
10. The machine-readable non-transitory storage medium of
deriving a hash value from the first code image; and
encrypting the hash value into the signature based on the key.
11. The machine-readable non-transitory storage medium of
storing the first code image in the device including the signature in the first header.
12. The machine-readable non-transitory storage medium of
deriving a second signature from the second code image using the key, wherein the second signature fails to match the second header.
13. The machine-readable non-transitory storage medium of
14. The machine-readable non-transitory storage medium of
15. The machine-readable non-transitory storage medium of
16. The machine-readable non-transitory storage medium of
18. The electronic device of
deriving a hash value from the first code image; and
encrypting the hash value into the signature based on the key.
19. The electronic device of
20. The electronic device of
21. The electronic device of
23. The electronic device of
24. The electronic device of
|
The present invention relates generally to electronic security. More particularly, this invention relates to booting a computing device securely.
As more and more computing devices are being used in people's daily life, security has become a widespread concern for users and content providers. Viruses, worms, Trojan horses, identity theft, software and media content piracy, and extortion using threats of data destruction are rampant. Usually, these attacks involve installing and executing malicious software codes to expose access to device resources that would otherwise be private to the system, the content provider, the user or an application.
For example, a hacker program when running in consumer computing devices developed to play audio/video content, such as Hollywood movies or music, could potentially allow the cracking of the encryption used to secure the A/V content. Therefore, high levels of security are usually required for such devices.
An operating system may provide some security features to guard against such attacks. However, the security features of an operating system often fail to keep up with new attacks occurring on a daily basis. Moreover, when booting a computing device, security features may not yet be initialized and are vulnerable to bypass and/or tampering.
Another way to guard against these attacks is to completely seal a computing device from installing and/or running any additional software after shipped out from manufacturers. Such a strict measure, however, severely limits the capabilities and the flexibilities of the underlying computing device. Not only does it make upgrading a computing device costly and difficult, it is not able to take advantage of increasing number of applications which do require downloading and running software codes from outside the device. In addition, the rapid technology advancement usually renders the applications or functionalities originally built inside a computing device obsolete within a very short period of time.
Therefore, current security measures do not deliver a robust solution to protect applications and content inside a computing device, while at the same time providing the flexibility to update the software and or firmware for the device.
A method and apparatus for executing codes embedded inside a device to verify a code image loaded in a memory of the device are described herein. A code image may be executed after being verified to be a trusted code image. The embedded codes may be stored in a secure storage area such as a ROM (read only memory) of the device. In one embodiment, the verification of the code image is based on a key stored within the secure storage area. The key may be unique to each device. Access to the key may be controlled by the associated secure storage area. The device may complete establishing an operating environment subsequent to executing the verified code image.
In an alternative embodiment, the code image may represent a kernel of an operating system (OS) that provides an operating environment of a device. The code image may be loaded from a mass storage of the device. Upon being successfully verified using a key stored within the secure ROM and the key uniquely identifying the device, the code image may be executed in a main memory of the device to set up the kernel of the OS in order to establish the operating environment of the device. In one embodiment, the device is a portable device.
In an alternative embodiment, a first executable image embedded from a secure ROM (read-only memory) of a device may be executed to initialize a mass storage device associated with the device to enable the mass storage device to be accessed. The secure ROM may have stored therein a unique identifier (ID) uniquely identifying the device. Upon successfully initializing the mass storage device, a second executable image stored within the mass storage device may be located and verified using the unique identifier (ID) embedded within the secure ROM. After being successfully verified, the second executable image may be executed to perform low level hardware initialization on the device. The second executable image may be successfully executed to locate and execute a third executable image to verify and load a kernel image of an operating system (OS) for the device. The kernel image may be successfully executed to initialize and configure a remainder of the OS for the device.
Other features of the present invention will be apparent from the accompanying drawings and from the detailed description that follows.
The present invention is illustrated by way of example and not limitation in the figures of the accompanying drawings, in which like references indicate similar elements and in which:
A method and an apparatus for secure booting of a computing device are described herein. In the following description, numerous specific details are set forth to provide thorough explanation of embodiments of the present invention. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art, that embodiments of the present invention may be practiced without these specific details. In other instances, well-known components, structures, and techniques have not been shown in detail in order not to obscure the understanding of this description.
Reference in the specification to “one embodiment” or “an embodiment” means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment can be included in at least one embodiment of the invention. The appearances of the phrase “in one embodiment” in various places in the specification do not necessarily all refer to the same embodiment.
The processes depicted in the figures that follow, are performed by processing logic that comprises hardware (e.g., circuitry, dedicated logic, etc.), software (such as is run on a general-purpose computer system or a dedicated machine), or a combination of both. Although the processes are described below in terms of some sequential operations, it should be appreciated that some of the operations described may be performed in different order. Moreover, some operations may be performed in parallel rather than sequentially.
The term “host” and the term “device” are intended to refer generally to data processing systems rather than specifically to a particular form factor for the host versus a form factor for the device.
In one embodiment, secure booting a device may be designed to ensure critical resources within the device will be protected in an operating environment. In the mean time, secure booting a device may provide a flexibility to allow software running inside the device to be updated and installed under different policies and procedures without requiring unnecessary management, material and/or performance costs. In one embodiment, the security of booting a device may be performed by the code and data stored inside a secure storage area such as a ROM (Read Only Memory), also referred to as a secure ROM, integrated together within the device. The content of a secure ROM may be stored during a manufacturing stage of the device. The secure ROM may be associated with a UID (Unique Identifier) of the device, which uniquely identifies the device. A trust of a software code running in the device may be rooted from a code image signed through the secure ROM based on the UID.
According to one embodiment, the secure ROM of a device may include a fingerprint of a root certificate of a trusted entity. A code image certified through the trusted entity may be trusted to be executed in the device according to a certification process via the secure ROM based on the fingerprint. In one embodiment, secure booting the device may recover trusted software codes when coupled with the trusted entity according to the secure ROM. The secure ROM may extend a trust to a code image certified through the fingerprint based on the device UID stored. In one embodiment, the secure ROM may allow application software restoration by certifying a code image downloaded from an external connection. In another embodiment, the secure ROM may force cleaning up user data stored inside the device by a trusted software code downloaded through external connection.
In one embodiment, codes 115 may cause loading a code image into a device memory such as memory component 103 or RAM 111. A code image may be loaded from a storage component 109 coupled with the chip 105. The storage component 109 may be a flash memory, such as a NAND flash, a NOR flash, or other mass storage (e.g., hard disk) components. In another embodiment, a code image may be loaded though a connection interface 101 from a source external to the device. The connection interface 101 may be based on a USB connection, an Ethernet connection, or a wireless network connection (e.g., IEEE 802.1x), etc. In one embodiment, codes 115 may cause storing a code image from a device memory into the storage component 109 after verifying the code image includes only trusted codes.
Before the device may start executing the code image loaded in the device memory, codes 115 may perform verification operations on the loaded code image to ensure the code image could be trusted. In one embodiment, codes 115 may verify a loaded code image according to data included in the chip 105, such as the data section 117 inside the ROM, a UID 119 and/or a GID (Global Identifier) 121. UIDs 119 may be unique for each device. In one embodiment, all devices are associated with a single GID 121. In one embodiment, a GID may be used to encrypt a code image to prevent code inspection. Data section 117 of the ROM 113 may store a fingerprint 123 based on a signature from a trusted entity such as a public key certificate. In one embodiment, separate devices may include fingerprints 123 based on the same trusted entity.
Code image iBoot 227 according to one embodiment, may be loaded into memory component 111 from storage 109 based on code image iBoot 231 according to execution of LLB 225. Code image iBoot 231 may cause hardware initialization for an operating system that provides an operating environment for the device housing system 100. A device may enter an operating environment after a successful booting. An operating environment may support various user and/or system applications running in the device. In one embodiment, code image iBoot 231 may enable mass storage components of the device, initialize graphic components for user interface, and/or activate screen components for the device, etc. Code image iBoot 231 may be stored from RAM 111 based on code image iBoot 227 via execution of code image LLB 225.
In one embodiment, code image Kernelcache 223 may be loaded from storage 109 to memory 103 based on code image Kernelcache 233. Code image Kernelcache 223 may be part of the kernel of an operating system to support the operating environment for the device. In one embodiment, code image Kernelcache 223 causes a kernel and operating system components 235 to be loaded into memory 103 from storage 109. Operating system components may include user applications, libraries, graphic user interface components, and/or user data 235. User data may include music, images, videos or other digital content associated with a user of the device. For example, such user data may be DRM (digital rights management) compliant data having restricted usages. Code image Kernelcache 223 may enable loading the kernel and the operating system components 235 into memory 103. In one embodiment, code image Kernelcache 223 may cause a verification process to ensure the kernel is trusted before being executed in memory 103. In another embodiment, code image Kernelcache 223 may cause a verification process to ensure an operating system component 235 is trusted before being executed in memory 103. Code image Kernelcache 223 may be executed to determine an operating system component 235 is trusted based on UID 119 or fingerprints 123. In one embodiment, code image Kernelcache 223 may cause decryption of an operation system component 235 in memory 103 according to GID 121. In one embodiment, code image Kernelcache 223 may be executed to store operating system components 235 from memory 103 into storage 109. Code image Kernelcache 223 may enable encrypting operating system components 235 before being stored in the storage 109.
In one embodiment, UID 119 may be accessible to some operating system components running in a privileged mode. The kernel of the operating system may deny or approve an application to access UID 119 by an application depending on whether the application is running in a privileged mode. In one embodiment, the kernel of the operating system may determine whether an application can be run in a privileged mode based on whether the corresponding code image of the application includes a properly signed signature. A DRM (Digital Right Management) system may be running in a privileged mode to control access to user data of the operating system components 235 based on UID 119. An application may access user data through a DRM system. In some embodiments, network utilities of the operation system may be privileged. Network utilities may enable the device to interconnect with outside resources though an interface chip, such as base band chip. In another embodiment, virus protection software may be provided by the operating system to run in a privileged mode.
Thus, any software components that will be running within the system must be verified or authenticated prior to the execution, unless the software components satisfy certain predetermined conditions (e.g., provided by a trust vendor or during certain circumstances such as manufacturing of the device or testing of the software components). In one embodiment, the settings of a secure storage area in the system may be associated with a predetermined condition. As a result, any data such as DRM compliant data would not be accessed or compromised without proper verification or authentication.
At block 305, according to one embodiment, the processing logic of process 300 may verify whether the loaded code image could be trusted based on a UID associated with the device such as UID 119 of
If the verification is successful, the processing logic of process 300 may execute the code image at block 311. In one embodiment, the code image may be an LLB, an iBoot or a Kernelcache as shown in 225, 227 and 223 in
At block 317, according to one embodiment, the booting process may continue when the processing logic of process 300 determines the device booting process is not complete at block 313. The processing logic of process 300 may locate another code image at block 313 based on executing the current code image. In one embodiment, executing code image LLB may locate code image iBoot as shown in
According to one embodiment, network 500 may include a device 501 coupled with a host 503. Device 501 may be a media player such as, for example, an iPod from Apple Computer Inc. running restoring daemon application to restore operating system components from the coupled host 503. Device 501 may be coupled with host 503 through a connection interface supporting TCP/IP protocols. The connection interface may be based on USB, a wireless network or an Ethernet, etc. In one embodiment, host 503 may be a Mac or Windows based computer running application software such as, for example, an iTune application from Apple Computer Inc. Host 503 may be connected to a central server 507 through the network 505 such as wide area network (e.g., Internet) or local area network (e.g., Intranet or peer-to-peer network). In one embodiment, central server 507 may be based on a publicly accessible web server. Alternatively, server 507 may be an Intranet or local server.
According to one embodiment, at block 607, the processing logic of process 600 may extract a certificate accompanying the code image received in the memory of the device. The code image may be a LLB, an iBoot and/or a Kernelcache as shown in
If the certificate from the code image is successfully verified, the processing logic of process 600 may continue the recovery process at block 615 to decrypt the code image based on the key included in the verified certificate. At block 617, the processing logic of process 600 may derive a hash signature from the code image based on a UID stored in a secure ROM of the device, such as UID 119 as shown in
During state Recovery1 717, the device may be coupled with a host computer to perform a recovery process such as shown in
In one embodiment, during state LLB 701, the device may execute the verified low level boot program (e.g., LLB or low level library as described above) to locate another boot image such as iBoot 231 shown in
During state Recovery2 719, the device may be coupled with a host computer to perform a recovery process such as shown in
During state iBoot 705, according to one embodiment, the device may execute the verified boot program to locate a kernel image such as Kernelcache 233 shown in
During state Recovery3 721, the device may be coupled with a host computer to perform a recovery process such as shown in
In one embodiment, during state Kernelcache 707, the device may execute a verified kernel image to locate operating system components such as 235 in
At block 807, according to one embodiment, the processing logic of process 800 may receive boot images from the connected host computer. The boot images may include a boot loader such as LLB 229 or iBoot 231 as shown in
At block 811, according to one embodiment, the processing logic of process 800 may receive a command from the connected host computer to execute a received boot image. The boot image may be a hoot loader. In response, the processing logic of process 800 may verify the boot image is trusted at block 813. In one embodiment, the processing logic of process 800 may perform a process such as shown in
At block 819, according to one embodiment, the processing logic of process 800 may receive and execute commands calls from the host computer via the restore daemon application to perform software restoration operations. In one embodiment, software restoration operations may include the partitioning and formatting of file systems of mass storage, device level restoration or loading new firmware into the device. The processing logic may start the OS included in the root image to launch the restore daemon in the device. In one embodiment, only the reduced portion or minimal portion of the OS is started. This daemon application may communicate with the restore software running in the connected host computer based on an XML (Extensible Markup Language) protocol. In one embodiment, the restore daemon may allow the restore software running on the host computer to issue arbitrary commands to be executed by the device. The commands may include executing auxiliary tools included in the RAM disk and/or making library calls. In one embodiment, the commands may cause replacing the entire set of software stored in the mass storage and the programmable ROM of the device. At block 821, the processing logic of process 800 may receive a command from the connected host computer to restart the device. In response, the processing logic of process 800 may reset the device. Subsequently, the device may reboot from the operating system stored in the mass storage of the device.
At block 905, according to one embodiment, the processing logic of process 900 may receive a code images from the connected host computer. The code image may include a software package related to an updated version of an application based on the version ID from the published status received by the host computer at block 903. In one embodiment, the code image may be loaded into a memory component of the device such as memory 103 as shown in
At block 1005, the processing logic of process 1000 may activate a programming interface to access device hardware by executing the code image. Device hardware may be accessed by reading or setting values of device hardware parameters. The processing logic may derive a hash value from the loaded code image to determine if the code image is not compromised (e.g., not corrupted). The determination may be based on a comparison between the derived hash value and a header value from the code image. In one embodiment, the processing logic of process 1000 may determine a UID is inactive at block 1007. The programming interface to access device hardware may cause an execution of codes inside a secure ROM such as codes 115 in
As shown in
The mass storage 1111 is typically a magnetic hard drive or a magnetic optical drive or an optical drive or a DVD RAM or a flash memory or other types of memory systems which maintain data (e.g. large amounts of data) even after power is removed from the system. Typically, the mass storage 1111 will also be a random access memory although this is not required. While
A display controller and display device 1207 provide a visual user interface for the user; this digital interface may include a graphical user interface which is similar to that shown on a Macintosh computer when running OS X operating system software. The system 1200 also includes one or more wireless transceivers 1203 to communicate with another data processing system, such as the system 1100 of
The data processing system 1200 also includes one or more input devices 1213 which are provided to allow a user to provide input to the system. These input devices may be a keypad or a keyboard or a touch panel or a multi touch panel. The data processing system 1200 also includes an optional input/output device 1215 which may be a connector for a dock. It will be appreciated that one or more buses, not shown, may be used to interconnect the various components as is well known in the art. The data processing system shown in
At least certain embodiments of the inventions may be part of a digital media player, such as a portable music and/or video media player, which may include a media processing system to present the media, a storage device to store the media and may further include a radio frequency (RF) transceiver (e.g., an RF transceiver for a cellular telephone) coupled with an antenna system and the media processing system. In certain embodiments, media stored on a remote storage device may be transmitted to the media player through the RF transceiver. The media may be, for example, one or more of music or other audio, still pictures, or motion pictures.
The portable media player may include a media selection device, such as a click wheel input device on an iPod® or iPod Nano® media player from Apple Computer, Inc. of Cupertino, Calif., a touch screen input device, pushbutton device, movable pointing input device or other input device. The media selection device may be used to select the media stored on the storage device and/or the remote storage device. The portable media player may, in at least certain embodiments, include a display device which is coupled to the media processing system to display titles or other indicators of media being selected through the input device and being presented, either through a speaker or earphone(s), or on the display device, or on both display device and a speaker or earphone(s). Examples of a portable media player are described in published U.S. patent application numbers 2003/0095096 and 2004/0224638, both of which are incorporated herein by reference.
Portions of what was described above may be implemented with logic circuitry such as a dedicated logic circuit or with a microcontroller or other form of processing core that executes program code instructions. Thus processes taught by the discussion above may be performed with program code such as machine-executable instructions that cause a machine that executes these instructions to perform certain functions. In this context, a “machine” may be a machine that converts intermediate form (or “abstract”) instructions into processor specific instructions (e.g., an abstract execution environment such as a “virtual machine” (e.g., a Java Virtual Machine), an interpreter, a Common Language Runtime, a high-level language virtual machine, etc.), and/or, electronic circuitry disposed on a semiconductor chip (e.g., “logic circuitry” implemented with transistors) designed to execute instructions such as a general-purpose processor and/or a special-purpose processor. Processes taught by the discussion above may also be performed by (in the alternative to a machine or in combination with a machine) electronic circuitry designed to perform the processes (or a portion thereof) without the execution of program code.
The present invention also relates to an apparatus for performing the operations described herein. This apparatus may be specially constructed for the required purpose, or it may comprise a general-purpose computer selectively activated or reconfigured by a computer program stored in the computer. Such a computer program may be stored in a computer readable storage medium, such as, but is not limited to, any type of disk including floppy disks, optical disks, CD-ROMs, and magnetic-optical disks, read-only memories (ROMs), RAMs, EPROMs, EEPROMs, magnetic or optical cards, or any type of media suitable for storing electronic instructions, and each coupled to a computer system bus.
A machine readable medium includes any mechanism for storing or transmitting information in a form readable by a machine (e.g., a computer). For example, a machine readable medium includes read only memory (“ROM”); random access memory (“RAM”); magnetic disk storage media; optical storage media; flash memory devices; electrical, optical, acoustical or other form of propagated signals (e.g., carrier waves, infrared signals, digital signals, etc.); etc.
An article of manufacture may be used to store program code. An article of manufacture that stores program code may be embodied as, but is not limited to, one or more memories (e.g., one or more flash memories, random access memories (static, dynamic or other)), optical disks, CD-ROMs, DVD ROMs, EPROMs, EEPROMs, magnetic or optical cards or other type of machine-readable media suitable for storing electronic instructions. Program code may also be downloaded from a remote computer (e.g., a server) to a requesting computer (e.g., a client) by way of data signals embodied in a propagation medium (e.g., via a communication link (e.g., a network connection)).
The preceding detailed descriptions are presented in terms of algorithms and symbolic representations of operations on data bits within a computer memory These algorithmic descriptions and representations are the tools used by those skilled in the data processing arts to most effectively convey the substance of their work to others skilled in the art. An algorithm is here, and generally conceived to be a self-consistent sequence of operations leading to a desired result. The operations are those requiring physical manipulations of physical quantities. Usually, though not necessarily, these quantities take the form of electrical or magnetic signals capable of being stored, transferred, combined, compared, and otherwise manipulated. It has proven convenient at times, principally for reasons of common usage, to refer to these signals as bits, values, elements, symbols, characters, terms, numbers, or the like.
It should be kept in mind, however, that all of these and similar terms are to be associated with the appropriate physical quantities and are merely convenient labels applied to these quantities. Unless specifically stated otherwise as apparent from the above discussion, it is appreciated that throughout the description, discussions utilizing terms such as “processing” or “computing” or “calculating” or “determining” or “displaying” or the like, refer to the action and processes of a computer system, or similar electronic computing device, that manipulates and transforms data represented as physical (electronic) quantities within the computer system's registers and memories into other data similarly represented as physical quantities within the computer system memories or registers or other such information storage, transmission or display devices.
The processes and displays presented herein are not inherently related to any particular computer or other apparatus. Various general-purpose systems may be used with programs in accordance with the teachings herein, or it may prove convenient to construct a more specialized apparatus to perform the operations described. The required structure for a variety of these systems will be evident from the description below. In addition, the present invention is not described with reference to any particular programming language. It will be appreciated that a variety of programming languages may be used to implement the teachings of the invention as described herein.
The foregoing discussion merely describes some exemplary embodiments of the present invention. One skilled in the art will readily recognize from such discussion, the accompanying drawings and the claims that various modifications can be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.
Smith, Michael, De Atley, Dallas Blake, de Cesare, Joshua, Wright, John Andrew
Patent | Priority | Assignee | Title |
10127384, | Oct 13 2009 | GOOGLE LLC | Firmware verified boot |
10142104, | Jan 07 2007 | Apple Inc. | Securely recovering a computing device |
10333955, | May 06 2015 | Hand Held Products, Inc. | Method and system to protect software-based network-connected devices from advanced persistent threat |
10379888, | Mar 30 2007 | Intel Corporation | Adaptive integrity verification of software and authorization of memory access |
10521617, | Aug 14 2017 | SanDisk Technologies, Inc | Non-volatile memory device with secure read |
10754956, | Nov 17 2015 | ANDIUM INC | Security stack for embedded systems |
10931451, | Jan 07 2007 | Apple Inc. | Securely recovering a computing device |
11062032, | Oct 13 2009 | GOOGLE LLC | Firmware verified boot |
11475123, | Sep 08 2020 | OSOM PRODUCTS, INC | Temporary removal of software programs to secure mobile device |
11625480, | Sep 08 2020 | OSOM PRODUCTS, INC | Mobile device with secure private memory |
11734018, | Jul 17 2020 | SanDisk Technologies, Inc | Parallel boot execution of memory devices |
11971994, | Oct 22 2015 | Musarubra US LLC | End-point visibility |
8555049, | Oct 05 2007 | Panasonic Corporation | Secure boot terminal, secure boot method, secure boot program, recording medium, and integrated circuit |
9230080, | Dec 19 2011 | LENOVO PC INTERNATIONAL LIMITED | Method of starting a computer using a biometric authentication device |
9378372, | Jul 15 2013 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd | Secure download and security function execution method and apparatus |
9489542, | Nov 12 2014 | Seagate Technology LLC | Split-key arrangement in a multi-device storage enclosure |
9710293, | Mar 30 2007 | Intel Corporation | Adaptive integrity verification of software using integrity manifest of pre-defined authorized software listing |
9916452, | May 18 2016 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC | Self-contained cryptographic boot policy validation |
9954871, | May 06 2015 | Hand Held Products, Inc. | Method and system to protect software-based network-connected devices from advanced persistent threat |
9984256, | May 15 2014 | Seagate Technology LLC | Storage device tampering detection |
Patent | Priority | Assignee | Title |
4975950, | Nov 03 1988 | FISHER, MARY E | System and method of protecting integrity of computer data and software |
5121345, | Nov 03 1988 | System and method for protecting integrity of computer data and software | |
5713024, | Jun 10 1994 | Exabyte Corporation | Cold boot data backup system |
6167521, | Aug 29 1997 | IBM Corporation | Securely downloading and executing code from mutually suspicious authorities |
6185678, | Oct 02 1997 | REMBRANDT PATENT INNOVATIONS, LLC | Secure and reliable bootstrap architecture |
6188602, | Jan 25 2000 | DELL USA, L P | Mechanism to commit data to a memory device with read-only access |
6260078, | Jul 03 1996 | Oracle America, Inc | Using a distributed object system to find and download java-based applications |
6263431, | Dec 31 1998 | Intel Corporation | Operating system bootstrap security mechanism |
6330670, | Oct 26 1998 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC | Digital rights management operating system |
6473791, | Aug 17 1998 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC | Object load balancing |
6587947, | Apr 01 1999 | Intel Corporation | System and method for verification of off-chip processor code |
7383442, | Mar 23 1998 | EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC | Nested strong loader apparatus and method |
20020002684, | |||
20020019985, | |||
20020133576, | |||
20030056107, | |||
20030059049, | |||
20030095096, | |||
20040064457, | |||
20040092310, | |||
20040224638, | |||
20050033969, | |||
20050091501, | |||
20050138409, | |||
20050144448, | |||
20050185067, | |||
20050228980, | |||
20060069692, | |||
20060090084, | |||
20060156007, | |||
20060174109, | |||
20060200859, | |||
20060236111, | |||
20060259592, | |||
20060265733, | |||
20070136523, | |||
20080052769, | |||
CN1553315, | |||
EP961193, | |||
EP1085396, | |||
EP1369764, | |||
EP1491983, | |||
EP1659472, |
Executed on | Assignor | Assignee | Conveyance | Frame | Reel | Doc |
Jan 07 2007 | Apple Inc. | (assignment on the face of the patent) | / | |||
Mar 05 2007 | SMITH, MICHAEL | Apple Inc | ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS | 019163 | /0396 | |
Mar 05 2007 | DE CESARE, JOSHUA | Apple Inc | ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS | 019163 | /0396 | |
Mar 05 2007 | DE ATLEY, DALLAS BLAKE | Apple Inc | ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS | 019163 | /0396 | |
Mar 05 2007 | WRIGHT, JOHN ANDREW | Apple Inc | ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS | 019163 | /0396 |
Date | Maintenance Fee Events |
Jul 30 2012 | ASPN: Payor Number Assigned. |
Feb 10 2016 | M1551: Payment of Maintenance Fee, 4th Year, Large Entity. |
Feb 13 2020 | M1552: Payment of Maintenance Fee, 8th Year, Large Entity. |
Apr 15 2024 | REM: Maintenance Fee Reminder Mailed. |
Date | Maintenance Schedule |
Aug 28 2015 | 4 years fee payment window open |
Feb 28 2016 | 6 months grace period start (w surcharge) |
Aug 28 2016 | patent expiry (for year 4) |
Aug 28 2018 | 2 years to revive unintentionally abandoned end. (for year 4) |
Aug 28 2019 | 8 years fee payment window open |
Feb 28 2020 | 6 months grace period start (w surcharge) |
Aug 28 2020 | patent expiry (for year 8) |
Aug 28 2022 | 2 years to revive unintentionally abandoned end. (for year 8) |
Aug 28 2023 | 12 years fee payment window open |
Feb 28 2024 | 6 months grace period start (w surcharge) |
Aug 28 2024 | patent expiry (for year 12) |
Aug 28 2026 | 2 years to revive unintentionally abandoned end. (for year 12) |